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OUR COMMON HOME

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN SWEDEN

COMMON HOME
— series —

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For more information about MIND follow the campaign:

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

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FOREWORD

Sweden has a long history of migration as well as emigration. Movement of people across borders has occurred for a variety of reasons such as trade and work as well political crises such as war. The treatment received by immigrants and emigrants has varied with the times. Nevertheless, whether migrants or emigrants, the goal is generally the same, the hope of a better life, for themselves and in particular for their children.

During the 1800s and early 1900s Sweden emigration was the primary term used to describe Sweden. About 1.5 million Swedes left for other countries, mainly the United States. The goal of a better life for the emigrants as well as for future generations was a key motivator.

The same has occurred with immigrants to Sweden with the reasons ranging from such factors as work, to fleeing from persecution due to war or similar factors to family reunification. During the times of substantial outflows from Sweden, immigration to Sweden stayed at a fairly small scale. Nevertheless, the contribution of the migrants to the development of the country's economy and political system has been significant.

Beginning in the mid-20th century, after World War II more substantial changes took place. Sweden's factories were still standing in country where there was more than full employment. The solution became a sharp increase in labour immigration. During the late 1960s a choice was made to increasingly rely on workers at home. However, the 1970s were a time when the number of political refugees from Europe and Latin America began to rise. This was later followed by an inflow of refugees from Africa, Asia and the Middle East, drawn here partly by the country's fairly generous refugee policies.

The inflows of immigrants have generally resulted in various forms of racism bubbling to the surface concerning the "other". While the attitudes of most Swedes remained welcoming in various periods, Sweden has nevertheless struggled with the adoption and implementation of laws against discrimination.

The early 1990s with the resulting large inflow of refugees from former Yugoslavia was a stimulus to the establishment of our first anti-immigrant party in Parliament. They lost in a later election due to internal issues. Nevertheless the groundwork was laid.

During the 2000s Sweden had a relatively generous refugee policy. There was even a large amount of consensus. This was to change, particularly with the very large arrival of migrants in 2015 seeking international protection. That year around 163.000 migrants came to Sweden. At the outset this stirred a great interest in civil society and thousands of volunteers helped in receiving these migrants. The media was also positive in its reporting.

But this arrival also put a major strain on government and local authorities, and also on the social services when it came to finding housing, places in schools for the children and access to health care. Taken together the costs for receiving such a large number of persons rose dramatically.

This in turn provided momentum to Sweden's growing far right party in its ongoing critique of migration as such. The media began reporting on the various effects, and the general public attitudes started shifting, and became more negative to receiving more migrants. This resulted in substantial stress for the other parties. Finally, the government shifted gears and introduced a new bill to cut down on the benefits given to the "new arrivals" and in granting visas. A temporary law was passed and went into effect on the 20th of July 2016 for a period of three years. Among other things, this law restricted the issuing of permanent residence visas to a minimum. Instead temporary permits were given, if at all. Family reunification became virtually impossible for asylum seekers with subsidiary form of protection needs, and difficult to obtain for refugees, due to conditionality.

The new minority government formed in January 2019 has agreed to prolong the temporary on aliens another two years, while promising an examination of certain details such as family reunification. However, what is clearly needed is a complete review of this field of law, given the confusing patchwork of amendments, laws and regulations developed over many by differing political majorities.

Caritas Sweden is a part of the structure of the Catholic Church in Sweden. It is a member of Caritas Internationalis uniting more than 160 national Catholic aid organizations, thus being one of the world's largest actors in the field of humanitarian aid and development.

In its work Caritas Sweden has been active in its advocacy on issues concerning migrants, refugees and victims of trafficking since the 1990s. Since 2017 Caritas Sweden is also involved in the "MIND" project led by Caritas Austria in the framework of the operating grant financed by the European Commission, DG DEVCO.

MIND, which stands for ***M**igration*, ***I**nterconnectedness*, ***D**evelopment*, is a three-year project that seeks to contribute to increased awareness and understanding of the complexities of migration in Europe. It includes Caritas organisations in 11 EU member countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden as well as the regional secretariat of Caritas Europa.

The MIND project aims to improve public understanding of the relation between sustainable development and migration, the role of migration in EU member states, and the EU contribution in development cooperation. It intends to increase the engagement of European society, its actors and its institutions, including government authorities, civil society organizations (CSOs), the private sector, faith-based actors, universities and knowledge centres, grassroots organisations, migrants and diaspora organisations, and refugee self-organisations. The project aims to address three areas of concern:

- *Root causes:* identifying reasons that force people to migrate, contributing to the understanding of linkages between migration and sustainable development, and addressing the immediate needs of people forcedly displaced.

- *Welcoming societies:* identifying safe and legal pathways of migration, promoting encounter and contributing to long-term solutions for building welcoming societies as well as changing anti-migration narratives and addressing racism and xenophobia.

- *Migrants' contribution to sustainable development:* enhancing recognition of migration and involvement of migrants as development actors in countries of origin and of destination.

Stockholm in April 2019

Henrik Alberius
President of Caritas Sverige

- CHAPTER 2 -

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Sweden and migration

Although it has not always been a part of Sweden's self-image, migration to and from Sweden has always been an important element of Swedish history, starting already during Viking times. During the late 1800s and early 1900s, Sweden was clearly a country of emigration. However, this study on migration and development has a focus on the post-World War II context, a context in which immigration, whether as workers, refugees or family members, has increasingly become an undeniable part of the Swedish narrative.

The interconnection between migration and development is increasingly becoming apparent to researchers, politicians, civil servants and practitioners. While the link between them is acknowledged, understanding how they influence each other is more difficult. This study, an analysis of current realities, policies and debates, is intended to lay a foundation for a better understanding of the interconnectedness between migration and development in the Swedish context. A better understanding is needed to recognise and understand the positive role that migrants can and do play in relation to Sweden as well as their countries of origin.

Certain key issues concerning the broader Caritas Common Home / MIND project need to be mentioned. For an accurate analysis of the interconnectedness of migration and development, Caritas uses a broad understanding of migration that includes those who are refugees and asylum seekers as well as migrant workers and members of their families.

Caritas uses the concept of integral human development, which places the human person at the centre of the development process. It is an all-embracing approach that takes into consideration the well-being of the person and of all people in seven different dimensions. These are (1) the social dimension, (2) the work and economic activity dimension, (3) the ecological dimension, (4) the political dimension, (5) the economic dimension, (6) the cultural dimension, and (7)

the spiritual dimension. Taken together, those dimensions underpin an integral approach to development.

There are two grounds underlined by Caritas that underpin the action needed by society and governments: 1) social questions are global, and 2) socio-economic inequalities are a danger for peace and social cohesion. In this sense, development of our own country and that of others must be the concern of us all – the human community.

Caritas recognizes that a growing number of people are forced to leave their countries of origin not only because of conflicts and persecution but also because of other existential threats. Forced migration for Caritas encompasses all migratory movements where an element of coercion exists. People fleeing conflicts and persecution naturally have a particular claim and right to international refugee protection. Caritas also recognizes that the overwhelming proportion of migration in and to Europe reflects a need in EU member countries for 'foreign' labour and skills. This is necessary to maintain a viable work force capable of sustaining their own development.

In Caritas' view, both people who migrate and those who remain – whether in country of origin or in country of residence – have the right to find wherever they call home the economic, political, environmental and social conditions to live in dignity and achieve a full life. Regardless of the legal status in a country, all migrants and refugees possess inherent human dignity and Human Rights that must be respected, protected and fulfilled by all States at all times.

Caritas also calls for a human response of solidarity and cooperation to assume responsibility for integral human development worldwide and for the protection and participation of people on the move – migrants and refugees. Migration contributes to the integral human development of migrants and of members of their countries of residence. Such a vision implies the recognition that migration, regardless of its drivers, is an opportunity for our societies to build a more prosperous, global "Common Home", where everyone can make a contribution and live in dignity.

After WWII Sweden had a clear sense of its need for foreign workers. Up through the late 1960s, many came to Sweden for jobs from war-torn Europe. Many of those who came were from Finland as well as southern European countries including areas in former Yugoslavia. Swedish companies even actively recruited from outside the country. During the late 1960s and early 1970s labour migration was made much more difficult. The focus shifted from filling labour needs with foreign workers to filling those needs with underutilized Swedish labour, primarily women. Concerning labour migrants, it was not a formal guest worker system. They were essentially expected to become a part of Swedish society.

As the labour migration regulations and implementation became extremely restrictive, except for people from Finland due to an agreement between the Nordic countries, Sweden started experiencing increasing numbers of refugees entering the country during the 1970s from e.g. Chile. During the 1980s forward, Sweden has received refugees from all over the world, particularly due to wars and other crises. There were major spikes in refugee numbers in the early 1990s due to the crisis in former Yugoslavia and in the mid-2010s due in particular to the crisis in Syria. Sweden has generally responded with a sense of solidarity and responsibility over the years concerning refugees and asylum-seekers.

The aim of this study is to examine migration and development from a Swedish perspective and shed some light on their interplay. In doing so, this can also illuminate the positive role that migrants can and do play concerning development of their countries of origin and their new home in Sweden. The idea of a Common Home needs to be emphasised. Everyone living in Sweden, including migrants, needs to have the right to feel at home, to know that they have a right to respect for who they are, for their competencies and desires. It is in this kind of atmosphere that individuals strive to be all they can be, to flourish. Knowing that you are part of a Common Home provides that kind of environment.

This study is also a means to improve the public's understanding of the relation between universal sustainable development and migration in Sweden and in various developing countries. This also provides some insight into Sweden's development cooperation together with civil society organisations (CSOs) and others concerning issues related to migration, which also provides support to idea of migrants and refugees as highly relevant development actors.

Migrants over the years and currently clearly contribute to the development of Sweden in various ways. Their economic contributions include participation in the labour market as well as business owners and developers. Their financial remittances to their countries of origin are also important. There are also the social and cultural contributions that flow in both directions – to Sweden and countries of origin – in terms of skills, knowledge, ideas and values. Another important issue is the key role of migrant organisations and other related organisations.

Migrants face a variety of barriers and challenges. In recent years there has been an increasingly negative image of migrants and migration. This has also meant that the term integration has lost its broader meaning relating to equal rights, duties and opportunities, which meant a focus on the majority as well as migrants or others with an ethnic background other than Swedish. This in turn contributes to the barriers related to access to legal rights, the labour market, education and housing. These are obstacles that impede the full contribution of migrants to Sweden.

There are also obstacles to full contribution to their countries of origin, depending on the circumstances in those countries. They range from wars and other similar conflicts, to civil unrest, unstable security situations, and the lack of a rule of law to the lack of a stable infrastructure for investment.

In addition to the various barriers and challenges, various opportunities for facilitation of the contributions of migrants to the development of Sweden and their countries of origin are highlighted, opportunities that should also lead to their own integral sustainable development.

The study takes into account in particular the connection to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with its Sustainable Development Goals, and the government's ambitions and planning in this regard. SDG Target 10.7 on "safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility" explicitly refers to migration and development. The Agenda adopted in Quito in October 2015 provides even more explicit attention to migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons in its global development and governance framework for cities – where most migrants and refugees reside.

The study ends with certain conclusions and a variety of recommendations.

Conclusions on migration and development

The study underlines the importance for Sweden of maximising the development benefits of migration for all. In order to do so, it is necessary to continue a focus on the link between migration and development policy by addressing the root causes of displacement in countries of origin as well as dealing with the difficulties in establishing a common home in countries of destination.

Migrants contribute to the economic, social and cultural development of Sweden. Migrant contributions are particularly visible in urban areas. This applies to a variety of areas such as working life, culture, journalism and education.

Sweden has distinguished itself by its efforts to develop appropriate migration and integration policies, through continuous efforts to find and adapt solutions to the complex and demanding tasks of transnational migration. As a destination for migration, Sweden acquired over the years an almost legendary reputation of being a country of compassionate humanitarian traditions, which led to the arrival of a relatively high number of migrants, especially asylum-seekers, particularly in relation to its overall population of about 10 million.

Over time this resulted in a large population with migrant background, but has also contributed to a strong socioeconomic development in spite of a seemingly ongoing global crisis. This indicates that migration has contributed in multiple ways to the development of the Swedish society: not only to a more balanced demographic development, ensuring avoidance of a negative, "inverted" population pyramid structure, but also adding to Sweden's creative capacities and technological development.

Although research shows that immigration has benefited Sweden, the challenges are not lacking. Two issues have been crucial. The large increase in newly-arrived migrants in 2015 has provided support to a negative trend in politics, in the media and in public opinion. The question then becomes how to return to overcome such short-term negative trends. In addition, there is the longer term issue of establishing equal rights, duties and opportunities in regard to primary issues such as working life, housing, the legal system and education. These issues are of particular importance in helping migrants establish a belief in their future and their children's future in Sweden. Naturally these issues are important not only for migrants as well as ethnic and national minorities but also for others who risk discrimination and marginalisation in Sweden. It is also important in that such a belief can inspire individuals to fully contribute to Sweden's development and potentially their countries of origin.

Many researchers conclude that while immigration should be regarded as a resource, integration remains a challenge, especially as policymakers have drifted away from the principle of equal rights, duties and opportunities, which included a focus on majority society as well. Today there is a short term and short-sighted focus on new arrivals. While there are and certainly have been important short-term issues, there is the risk that those lead to short-sighted solutions that undermine the aspirations of migrants, thus needlessly limiting sustainable development in Sweden. Those aspirations are a key element to the proper use of the capabilities and creative capacities of all residents of Sweden, including migrants. At the same time in spite of difficulties concerning e.g. employment, it also important to realise and recognize that most immigrants go to work every day and that many jobs and opportunities are created by immigrant businesses and initiatives. This will continue to be the case as long as Sweden continues to develop and implement forward-looking policies, such as the ones put forward in Caritas' recommendations..

The recommendations concern the following topics:

1. Resolving gaps concerning migration law, policy and practice,
2. Promotion of equality and prevention of discrimination,
3. Changing the negative narrative on migrants, refugees and migration,
4. Expand safe and legal pathways of migration,
5. Enhance the engagement and empowerment of migrants locally as well as concerning countries of origin,
6. Enhance engagement of cities and local actors in integration focusing on equal right, duties and opportunities,
7. Apply and enforce labour law, decent work standards and occupational safety and health protection for all migrants,
8. Strengthen Sweden's support for regional, national and integral human development elsewhere,
9. Improve data collection and knowledge to enhance the migration-development nexus, and
10. Ensure Human Rights protection of all migrants and refugees.

- CHAPTER 3 -

VISION AND VALUES

The "common home" vision and values: migration, development and human rights

In his encyklikal *Laudato Si' – On care for our common home,* pope Francis (2015) reminded us that the Earth is "our common home", and that we need to address economic, social, political and environmental challenges together in an integrated manner (CAFOD et al. 2018). Exclusion and poverty, warfare, global inequalities, climate change, unsustainable consumption and growth –as well as forced displacement and migration—demand our utmost attention and engagement. The encyclical quickly became a reference document for Catholic social service as well as development agencies worldwide, drawing attention both in and outside the Catholic Church. With the national and European "Common Home" publications, Caritas draws on this message to explore the complex *interconnectedness* between migration and development with its faith-based ethical framework respectful of human rights and dignity.

For Caritas, a human-centred, ethical and rights-based approach is fundamental to law, to very policy, and to all practice. Thus, an ethical interpretation of the relation between migration, development and the human person is essential to frame the vision and the objectives of the "Common Home publication". Caritas' vision, actions and views are rooted in legal and political instruments and sources and fundamentally in Christian and Roman Catholic Church values and teaching. These values and teachings have in common with international legal instruments and policy frameworks an affirmation of human dignity, equality of all, and inalienability of human rights as key moral principles to ensure the peaceful coexistence and basic well-being of all persons and peoples on this planet. Those include: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and eight fundamental United Nations human rights covenants and conventions;[1] the 1951 Refugee Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; and the International Labour Standards defining principles and rights for decent work. The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the New Urban Agenda are especially relevant global policy frameworks. Catholic Social Teaching (CST), doctrine developed by the Catholic Church on matters of social and economic justice and fundamental Christian values are the foundations for Caritas views and action.

In *Laudato Si'*, Pope Francis (2015: 12) has argued that "the urgent challenge to protect our common home includes a concern to bring the whole human family together to seek a sustainable and integral development." Moreover, he has called for a dialogue including everyone about "how we are shaping the future of our planet" (2015:12), questioning the current model of development and the present condition of global society where injustices are numerous and more and more people are deprived of fundamental human rights. This demands "prioritising the weakest members of society as a way of measuring progress" (CAFOD et al. 2018: 16). Human rights can be defined as protections for individuals and groups, guaranteed under international law, against interferences with fundamental freedoms and human dignity. Human rights are *inalienable* and cannot be denied to or relinquished by any human being, regardless of any reason including legal or immigration status. They are *universal* in that they apply to everyone, everywhere. Human rights encompass civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, and are *indivisible*, meaning that the different sets of rights are all equally important for the full development of human beings and his/her well-being. Human rights instruments and customary international law generate three overarching obligations for States, namely: to respect, to protect, and to fulfil those rights.

1) The International Convention on the Elimination of all Form of Racial Discrimination (1965), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006).

Migration

Migration is a major feature of today's globalized world. In broad terms, migration is the movement of people from one place of residence to another. While the term migration covers population movement internal to a country – rural to urban or from one locality to another in a different jurisdiction, the MIND project addresses international migration. International migration is a distinct legal, political and social category, as people move from a nation-state in which they are citizen with the rights and protections citizenship normally confers, to other countries where rights and protections of nationality, of access to social protection, and of common identity often do not apply and where social and cultural paradigms may be significantly different.

While there is no international normative definition for migration, international conventions provide agreed definitions for *refugees* and for *migrant workers and members of their families;* the latter applicable to nearly all international migrants. The definition of a refugee in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees is: *"someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion"*.[2] All EU member States have ratified both the 1951 refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.

The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW) states that: *The term "migrant worker" refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national*.[3] That convention recognizes *frontier worker, seasonal worker, seafarer, offshore worker, itinerant worker*, and other specific categories of migrant workers as covered under its provisions. The ICRMW iterates that all basic human rights cover family members present with and dependent on migrant workers. Data from the International Labour Organization (ILO) shows that nearly all international migrants, whatever their reasons for migration or admission, end up economically active – employed, self-employed or otherwise engaged in remunerative activity.

However, a specific definition and statistical standards to obtain reliable and comparable data on international migrants have been agreed under UN auspices and are used by most governments. For statistical purposes, an *international migrant* is defined as 'a person who has resided in a country other than that of birth or citizenship for one year or more, irrespective of the causes or motivations for movement and of legal status in the country of residence.' There are an estimated 260 million foreign-born people residing today in countries other than where they were born or held original citizenship.[4] However, this figure does not include persons visiting a country for short periods such as tourists, nor commercial or transportation workers who have not changed their place of established residence. Many other persons in temporary, short-term or seasonal employment and/or residence situations are not counted in UN and other statistics on *migrants* when their sojourn is less than a year and/or if they retain formal residency in their home or another country – even though they may fit the definition of *migrant worker*. For an accurate analysis of the interconnectedness of migration and development, Caritas uses a broad understanding of migration, inclusive of all those who are refugees and asylum seekers as well as migrant workers and members of their families.

Development

The pledge to leave no one behind and to ensure human rights for all is a cornerstone of the Resolution by the UN General Assembly 70/1 "*Transforming our world: 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*" that contains the Declaration and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with 169 sustainable development Targets, adopted 25 September 2015. This document endorsed by all 193 UN Member States expresses their shared vision of and commitment to a "*world of universal respect for human rights and human dignity, the rule of law, justice, equality and non-discrimination; of respect for race, ethnicity and cultural diversity; and of equal opportunity permitting the full realization of human potential and contributing to shared prosperity. A world which invests in its children and in which every child grows up free from violence and exploitation. A world in which every woman and girl enjoys full gender equality and all legal, social and economic barriers to their empowerment have been removed. A just, equitable, tolerant, open and socially inclusive world in which the needs of the most vulnerable are met.*" [5]

The 2030 Agenda has led to paradigm shifts in the perception of development: development and sustainable development concerns all countries on the planet; environmental protection and tackling inequalities are considered among key development goals; peace and social justice are seen as integral components of the universal development agenda; and the need for the commitment and participation of all groups within all societies and states is emphasised in order

2) See UNHCR, What is a Refugee, at http://www.unhcr.org/what-is-a-refugee.html.

3) See full text at https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cmw.aspx.

4) Extrapolated from UNDESA (2017). As noted in UNDESA estimates, "The estimates are based on official statistics on the foreign-born or the foreign population, classified by sex, age and country of origin. Most of the statistics utilised to estimate the international migrant stock were obtained from population censuses. Additionally, population registers and nationally representative surveys provided information on the number and composition of international migrants."

5) The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, paragraph 8.

to achieve development for all. The new worldwide consensus on development is grounded in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and all human rights treaties; therefore, if states do not make progress on the actual realization of human rights for all, the SDGs cannot be reached.

The term *development* encapsulates the elaboration of productive means, forces, capacities, organization and output of goods, services, technology and knowledge to meet human needs for sustenance and well-being. It comprises building the means for: extraction and transformation of resources; production of goods, services and knowledge; constructing infrastructure for production, transportation and distribution; reproducing capital as well as skills and labour; and providing for human welfare/well-being in terms of housing, nutrition, healthcare, education, social protection and culture in its broad sense (Taran 2012).

Caritas uses the concept of **integral human development**, which places the human person at the centre of the development process. It may be defined as an all-embracing approach that takes into consideration the well-being of the person and of all people in seven different dimensions. First, the *social* dimension, which focuses on quality of life in terms of nutrition, health, education, employment, social protection and social participation as well as equality of treatment and non-discrimination on any grounds. Second, the *work* and economic activity dimension as the main means of self- and family sustenance, of socio-economic engagement and of direct contribution to development for most adults in all populations. Third, the *ecological* dimension, which refers to respect for the goods of creation and to ensuring quality of life of future generations without ignoring this generation's cry for justice. Fourth, the *political* dimension, which includes issues such as: existence of the rule of law; respect for civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights; democracy, in particular as a representative and above all participatory tool. Fifth, the *economic* dimension, which relates to level of GDP and distribution of income and wealth, sustainability of economic growth, structure of the economy and employment, degree of industrialisation, level of high-tech ICT, and State capacity to obtain revenue for human services and social protection, among other considerations. Sixth, the *cultural* dimension, which addresses identity and cultural expression of communities and peoples, as well as capacity for intercultural dialogue and respectful engagement among cultures and identifies. Seventh, the *spiritual* dimension. Taken together, those dimensions underpin an integral approach to development (Caritas Europa 2010). According to *Catholic Social Teaching (CST)*, social inequalities demand coordinated action of all the people/ whole of the society and the whole of government in all countries for the sake of humanity based on two grounds: 1) social questions are global, and 2) socio-economic inequalities are

a danger for peace and social cohesion. In this sense, development of our own country and that of others must be the concern of us all – the human community.

> Those who **migrate** and those who **remain** both have the right to – wherever they call home – find the economic, political, environmental and social conditions to **live in dignity** and achieve a **full life**

Migration and development

How development is linked to *migration* is a centuries old law, policy and practical question. Vast forced and voluntary population movements from the 17th century onwards provided the people to develop the Americas North and South, as well as emerging European nation-States.

Since the end of World War II, migration and development has been the subject of intense discussions among policy-makers, academics, civil society and the public. Pope Pius XII dedicated an encyclical on "migrants, aliens and refugees of whatever kind who, whether compelled by fear of persecution or by want, is forced to leave his native land" (Exsul Familia 1952), reaffirming that migrants and refugees have a right to a life with dignity, and therefore *a right to migrate*.

Migration became a fundamental pillar of development across several regions under regional integration and development projects, notably the European Economic Community succeeded by the European Union. Since the 1970s, migration has been essential to development through regional free movement systems in Central, East and West Africa. From the 1920s, large population movements –some forced-- in the (former) Soviet Union underpinned industrial and agricultural development across the twelve USSR republics.

Spurred by geopolitical events that greatly affected human mobility on a global scale, the relationship between migration and development has become central in contemporary political and economic and social policy debates. The first global development framework to recognize the role of migration and its immense contribution to sustainable development worldwide was the Declaration and Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development at Cairo in 1994[6]. The overarching contemporary framework is the above-mentioned 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with its Sustainable Development Goals. While explicit reference to migration and development is laid out in SDG Target 10.7 on "safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility," more than 44 SDG Targets across 16 of the 17 SDGs apply to migrants, refugees, migration and/or migration-compelling situations (Taran et al. 2016). The New Urban Agenda adopted in Quito in October 2015 provides even more explicit attention to migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons in its global development and governance framework for cities –where most migrants and refugees reside.

Photo: Isabel Corthier

In 2016, in the wake of severe and protracted conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia and the collapse of effective protection for refugees in neighbouring countries, UN Member States adopted the *New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants*[7], calling for improved global governance of migration and for the recognition of international migration as driver for development in both countries of origin and of destination. The *Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)*, adopted at an inter-governmental conference in Marrakesh, Morocco in November 2018, and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) elaborated on those principles and propose ways of implementing them through political dialogue and non-binding commitments. Both Compacts were adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2018..

6) The ICPD was the biggest conference ever held on population, migration and development with 11,000 delegates from 179 countries and some 4,000 participants in the parallel NGO Forum. Two of the ten chapters of the Programme of Action were entirely about migration and development. Adopted by all 179 States/governments participating, the ICPD Declaration and 20-year Programme of Action (extended in 2010) continues to serve as a comprehensive guide to people-centred development progress. https://www.unfpa.org/fr/node/9038

7) UN Resolution 71/1. New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. Adopted by the General Assembly on 19 September 2016. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/1

Caritas recognises that a growing number of people are forced to leave their countries of origin not only because of conflicts and persecution but also because of other existential threats. Those include poverty, hunger, unemployment and absence of decent work, lack of good governance, absence of access to education and healthcare, as much as the consequences of climate change. Forced migration for Caritas encompasses all migratory movements where an element of coercion exists. People fleeing conflicts and persecution naturally have a particular claim and right to international refugee protection. Caritas also recognizes that the overwhelming proportion of migration in and to Europe reflects most EU member countries' objective need for 'foreign' labour and skills to maintain viable work forces capable of sustaining their own development. This demand results from rapidly evolving technologies, changes in the organization of work and where it takes place and declining native work forces reflecting population ageing and declining fertility.

In Caritas' view, both people who migrate and those who remain –whether in country of origin or in country of residence– have the right to find wherever they call home the economic, political, environmental and social conditions to live in dignity and achieve a full life. Regardless of the legal status in a country, all migrants and refugees possess inherent human dignity and human rights that must be respected, protected and fulfilled by all States at all times. Caritas calls for a human response of solidarity and cooperation to assume responsibility for integral human development worldwide and for the protection and participation of people on the move –migrants and refugees. Migration contributes to the integral human development of migrants and of members of their countries of residence. Such a vision implies the recognition that migration, regardless of its drivers, is an opportunity for our societies to build a more prosperous, global "Common Home", where everyone can make a contribution and live in dignity.

- CHAPTER 4 -

INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL REPORT ON SWEDEN

Migration has always been an important element throughout Swedish history, starting already during Viking times (DELMI 2016:1, Boguslaw 2012, Svanberg & Tydén 1992). For a long period during the 1800s and early 1900s Sweden was generally known as a country of emigration rather than immigration. This study is however focused on modern history, primarily concerning the timespan when in-migration to Sweden intensified in the post-World War II context – particularly during the last two decades, and especially the most recent years.

The structure of this report follows the general outlines of the MIND project, adapted to the particularities of the Swedish context. It has used primary and secondary sources of information - from official reports, policy and legislation to academic literature and media reports, as well as supporting relevant statistics and practical experience. Issues concerning migration and development within the Swedish political landscape and related decision-making mechanisms in progress are given due contextual attention.

This report provides an analysis of the current situation, policies and debates in Sweden related to migration and development. It develops knowledge, evidence and analysis to examine the following question: How, and under what conditions, can and do migrants contribute to human development, their own, their society of origin and their society of residence?

This report first reviews the national migratory context. This is followed by an examination of how migrants contribute to Sweden and their countries of origin in relation to the economy, society, and culture. These sections form a backdrop to a presentation of the obstacles that can impede migrants' full contributions to development. The next part of the report identifies opportunities for facilitating and enhancing migrants' own development, contributions of migration to development, and shared responsibility and accountability.

Throughout the report there is an attempt to identify key factors that influence the potential of migrants and refugees to contribute to development in Sweden and their countries of origin. A key purpose is supporting the development potential of migration in a manner that ensures policy coherence and maximizes the benefits of immigration for both migrants and the society at large. The analysis is based on available academic literature, policy papers, statistical data, media reports and practical experience.

This report concludes by providing recommendations to the policy actors. The recommendations are to also function as an inspiration to Caritas and other relevant stakeholders in their future advocacy work concerning the protection of the rights of migrants, including promoting the full inclusion of migrants in Swedish society based on respect for them and their potential as individuals.



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- CHAPTER 5 -

THE NATIONAL MIGRATORY CONTEXT OF SWEDEN

5.1 Brief historical overview of Swedish emigration, immigration and development impacts

In 2018, Sweden had a population of 10 230 185 persons. Of these, 1 955 569 persons or about 19.1 per cent of the people living in Sweden were born abroad (Statistics Sweden 2019). This was the result of a long process during which the country turned from an early immigration country during the Middle Ages and pre-modern times to a predominantly emigration country in mid-1850s, and back to a net-immigration country by the 1950s.

Immigration of a variety of skilled workers contributed to Sweden´s development over time - already during the Middle Ages (e.g. German merchants, Jewish artisans, French and Scottish workers and Roma around 1500s, Walloons – instrumental for the industrial development in metallurgy – late 1600s, Jews – 1700s, also French artists and Italian bricklayers, Dutch merchants, etc.). However, from the 1850s, poverty, political constraints and religious persecution resulted in a lack of hope for the future. Combined with a longing for adventure these factors led to high levels of emigration (1.5 million Swedes) mainly to the Americas and Australia between 1850s-1930s. Their presence fuelled development in Canada and the USA, particularly in the dairy industry, forestry, agriculture as well as maritime and fisheries industries. The US development would not have been the same without the contribution of about 1.3 million Swedish immigrants. Today, some 4 million US citizens claim Swedish origin (particularly in Minnesota).[1] Graph 1 below clearly illustrates this period of emigration. As with immigrants in general, whether the reasons for migration are economic or political these Swedes were seeking a better life for themselves and in particular for their children.

By the beginning of WWII, the trend changed, and Sweden turned into a country of immigration in the 1940s, receiving refugees mainly from Finland, but also Germany and other Nordic and Baltic countries. That the 1940s are a turning point concerning Sweden becoming a country of immigration is clearly visible in Graph 1 below. Within less than a century, emigration continued to decrease while immigration levels constantly increased. The portion of the population with an immigrant background became an increasingly larger component of Sweden's population, with significant contributions to its development. During the 1950s and 1960s, the increase primarily involved labour migrants. However, in the decades after the 1960s, immigration flows were made up increasingly of refugees. The higher levels of refugees could be seen in certain peaks with each peak reflecting major events such as conflicts and political tensions in different parts of the world such as Chile, Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Iran, Iraq and Syria, among others. Concerning the increasing proportion of persons born outside of Sweden as well as with an immigration background in recent years see Table 2 below. It should also be noted that emigration levels, although not as large as inflows, nevertheless have tended to reflect significant numbers of people. For example, 46 981 people emigrated from Sweden during 2018, an increase of 1 361 persons compared to the year before. The most common countries of known emigration are Denmark, Norway and Great Britain. Many who emigrate are born in Sweden, but most of those who emigrate had previously immigrated to Sweden.[2]

1) Sweden and Migration, history, https://sweden.se/migration/#1850.
2) Statistics Sweden, accessed 2019-05-01, https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/sverige-i-siffror/manniskorna-i-sverige/utvandring-fran-sverige/.



GRAPH 1: FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION TO SWEDEN 1850-2017; NET IMMIGRATION TO SWEDEN
Source: www.migrationsinfo.se/migration/sverige/historiskt/

5.2. Immigration to/emigration from Sweden: education & socio-economic status of migrants

In the past 80 years, immigration has gone through various stages. At first numerous groups of asylum-seekers moved from Finland already in the 1940s, fleeing a war in which neutral Sweden managed to avoid direct participation. Intensive labour migration followed the end of WWII, with many, often directly recruited, migrants from countries such as Turkey, Italy, former Yugoslavia, as well as Finland, with an average of more than 20 000 persons annually during the 1960s (DELMI 2016:8). There was no formal guest worker policy (*gastarbeiterpolitik)* which meant that "unlike other Western European countries, Sweden had a policy of permanent immigration that treated migrant workers as future citizens" (Westin 2006).

There were also instances of refugee immigration due to political unrest in Hungary (1956), Greece (1967) and Czechoslovakia (1968) (Riniolo 2016, DELMI 2016:1, p. 46). Practically every major political/internal conflict in Latin America (e.g. Chile), the Middle East (Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Afghanistan) or Africa (Ethiopia/Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan) had its counterpart in migratory waves finding refuge in Sweden. The major peaks of asylum seekers came during the early 1990s (former Yugoslavia) as well as around 2015 (Syria etc.).

Refugees and family reunification became the dominant patterns for migration between 1972 through 1994 and on through to today. The primary reason was that a more regulated immigration was introduced at the end of the 1960s that was clearly put into practice during the 1970s onwards. Those who wanted to come to Sweden to work had to have proof of both employment offers and housing, as well as an Immigration Board labour market assessment, agreed to by the social partners, stating that Sweden was in need of foreign labour. Only then would a permit be granted. Essentially if there were unemployed people in Sweden able to perform the job, no work permit was to be given. This did not however apply to Nordic citizens due to an agreement from the 1950s between the Nordic countries on the right to settle and work in all of those countries without special permits. Thus the flow of workers from Finland continued and even increased for a number of years, to then be drastically reduced when there was an economic boom in Finland. At the same time the non-Nordic labour migration decreased substantially.[3] A key factor in the reduction of non-Nordic labour migrants related to a large extent to a desire by policymakers to stop the reliance on foreign labour to fill Sweden's demand for labour. It was decided that labour shortages would in the future be filled instead through recruitment of women into the labour force. In particular the unions had decided that they wanted to stop foreign labour, fearing that the increased competition would negatively affect Sweden's internal labour force (Migrationinfo 2016.). The new regulations took hold in particular after

3) Migration Board. History. https://www.migrationsverket.se/English/About-the-Migration-Agency/Migration-to-Sweden/History.html



GRAPH 2: REASONS FOR IMMIGRATION TO SWEDEN – ACCORDING TO LEGAL BASIS FOR GRANTING A RESIDENCE PERMIT
Source: Migration Agency

LO, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, recommended in 1972 through LO guideline 19/1972 (LO cirkulär nr 19/1972) that its member unions should in essence deny that there was any need for foreign labour in its communications with the Labour Market Authority. These guidelines were followed by the member unions leading to a sharp reduction in the issuance of work permits (SOU 2006:87, p. 89). This situation basically applied until legislative changes in 2008 concerning labour migrants essentially removed the veto that the unions up until then had exercised.[4] This in turn led to an increase in the number of labour migrants entering Sweden.

The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and the related dissolution of earlier political structures in Central and Eastern Europe also resulted in large numbers of refugees (and migrant workers) from that area. The Balkan War resulted in more than 100 000 refugees coming to Sweden from former Yugoslavia alone during 1992-94 (e.g. over 42 000 Bosnians). Repeated conflicts in the Middle East and Africa resulted in substantial numbers of asylum seekers arriving in Sweden (and Europe). However, *refugees* or *asylum seekers* were only about a third of all immigrants in Sweden. Many migrants came for *family reunification* reasons, and their number gradually increased from less than 10 000 a year until 1986 to over 25 000 in 1994 and finally reached almost 48 000 in 2017. After 1995, when Sweden became a member of the EU, there has also been an increase in the number of *intra-EU/EEA migrants.* As of 2015 the largest numbers of EU born residents came from Poland and Germany.[5]

Emigration of Swedish-born persons was about 10 000 per year, over a longer period, until the beginning of 1990s. The number has increased and since the late 1990s about 20 000 Swedish-born persons have emigrated annually. The emigration from Sweden of foreign-born persons follows a similar pattern. Until the beginning of the 21st century, there were about as many Swedish-born as foreign-born emigrants. Thereafter, the number of foreign-born emigrants has increased. This has been influenced by the increase of the total foreign-born population. This is a trend that is expected to continue. The tendencies however will vary. "Those who have come to Sweden as refugees or due to family ties have stayed in a greater extent, while those who immigrated to Sweden due to labour or studies have left the country to a greater extent."[6]

4) Nya regler för arbetskraftsinvandring Prop. 2007/08:147 (New rules on labour migration).
5) The Local, Here's where Sweden's foreigners come from, 2016-09-12, https://www.thelocal.se/20160912/heres-where-swedens-foreigners-come-from.
6) Statistics Sweden, Invandring och utvandring efter kön och födelseland 1970–2018 samt framskrivning 2019–2070 (Immigration and emigration by sex and country of birth 1970–2017 and projection 2018–2070), accessed 2019-05-01, https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter-amne/befolkning/befolkningsframskrivningar/befolkningsframskrivningar/pong/tabell-och-diagram/invandring-och-utvandring-efter-kon-och-fodelseland-samt-framskrivning/.

Year	Born	Dead	Birth surplus	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net migration	Population increase
2016	117	91	26	163	46	117	144
2017	121	91	30	151	58	94	124
2018	124	91	33	130	62	69	102
2019	127	91	35	132	64	68	104
2020	129	92	37	138	69	69	106
2026	132	97	35	119	68	51	86
2030	128	102	26	115	72	42	68
2040	134	113	21	109	80	29	50
2050	142	115	27	108	85	23	50
2060	143	122	21	109	87	22	43

TABLE 1: POPULATION CHANGES 2016 AND PROGNOSIS 2017-2060. IN THOUSANDS

Source: Statistics Sweden-SCB, Sveriges framtida befolkning 2017–2060 (The future population of Sweden 2017–2060); https://www.scb.se/contentassets/fee6de8eb7dc43bd9b3f36da925b5458/be0401_2017i60_sm_be18sm1701.pdf

Year	Foreign-born		Sweden-born with two foreign-born parents		Sweden-born with a Sweden-born and a foreign-born parent		Sweden-born with two Sweden-born parents	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
2002	504 550	548 913	156 619	148 132	283 358	270 414	3 482 580	3 546 222
2003	515 988	562 087	161 938	153 235	288 869	275 637	3 479 861	3 538 055
2004	525 953	574 309	167 606	158 425	294 605	280 915	3 478 147	3 531 432
2005	538 490	587 300	173 465	164 103	300 208	286 502	3 474 387	3 523 297
2006	564 431	610 769	180 446	170 531	306 199	292 387	3 472 447	3 516 047
2007	593 026	634 744	187 427	177 179	312 389	298 521	3 471 079	3 508 562
2008	620 084	661 497	195 065	184 357	318 890	304 917	3 469 671	3 501 866
2009	648 426	689 539	203 548	192 400	326 035	311 906	3 471 005	3 497 823
2010	673 083	711 846	212 324	200 636	333 445	319 203	3 471 392	3 493 641
2011	694 815	732 481	221 172	209 081	340 275	326 448	3 470 572	3 488 011
2012	717 303	755 953	230 604	218 132	347 566	333 528	3 470 432	3 482 375
2013	748 366	785 127	240 263	227 434	355 030	340 745	3 470 698	3 477 201
2014	787 473	816 078	251 099	237 556	362 458	347 855	3 471 210	3 473 626
2015	828 027	848 237	262 482	248 274	369 781	355 060	3 470 676	3 468 480
2016	890 095	894 402	275 289	260 516	377 302	362 511	3 470 661	3 464 377
2017	940 646	936 404	288 688	273 269	384 398	369 684	3 468 930	3 458 223

TABLE 2: SWEDEN'S IMMIGRANT BACKGROUND POPULATION 2002-2017 BY GENDER, BIRTHPLACE & PARENTS' BIRTHPLACE

Source: Statistics Sweden (http://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START__BE__BE0101__BE0101Q/UtlSvBakgFin/?rxid=cc4bb53e-14fd-474b-8ec3-96035498d538)

In general, since the early 1970s, Sweden had had little in the way of labour migration to Sweden. After a 2008 reform[7] *labour migration* was reintroduced as an official migrant category under new rules relating to labour migration. Gradually the number of labour migrants, foreign students and Swedes returning from abroad increased in numbers. During 2010-2015, even though immigration levels exceeded prognoses, only 1 out of 5 immigrants arriving in Sweden were asylum seekers or refugees (see Graph 2). Circular migration in a variety of forms also became an increasing phenomenon, due to the more favourable legislation concerning workforce migration. In 2016, due to migration Sweden experienced its largest growth in population in a long time.[8] Furthermore, migration led to almost 80% of the population increase in 2018, while the rest was a result of more births than deaths.[9]

According to a population forecast by Statistics Sweden, the Swedish population is expected to increase because it is assumed that more births than deaths will occur, and immigration is assumed to exceed emigration, which confirms earlier trends showing the compensatory demographic role of immigration. Immigration is also expected to counteract a possible negative demographic development by compensating for the relatively low annual birth-rate compared to deaths, as well as the relatively high expected rate of emigration (see table 1, upper left, and its reference).

In 2015, 163 000 people sought asylum in Sweden within a short period of time. Of these 70 000 were children (SOU 2017:12, p.16). It was a challenge for a country with a total population of around 10 million inhabitants to cope with the needs of a large number of persons arriving within a very short span of time (SOU 2017:12; RiR 2017:4).

Table 2 (below left) provides an indication as to Sweden's changes in population concerning persons with a foreign background. In particular from 2015 to 2017 the number of foreign born persons increased by about 200 000.

Due to the pressure felt in 2015, Sweden adopted a temporary law to restrict refugee migration to Sweden. The law is in effect until 19 July 2019. However, it has been agreed by the present ruling parliamentary constellation that took over in January 2019 that the law will be prolonged by two years. Government officials are clear in that the purpose of the temporary law was to make Sweden less attractive for potential asylum seekers and give a signal to other EU countries that they also have to take part of the responsibility for refugee reception. Presumably the law has contributed to the substantial decrease in asylum applications since 2015. In 2015 the number of applications was 162 877. This can be contrasted with 28 939 in 2016, 25 666 in 2017 and 21 502 in 2018.[10]

5.2.1 Education levels

There is a rather wide span concerning the level of education among various groups within the Swedish-born population – as well as among Sweden's migrant population. Concerning higher education (post-high school) the foreign born and Swedish born have essentially equivalent percentages. However, the foreign born have quite a large group that have a very low educational level. Approximately half of those participating in the initial establishment phase lack the equivalent of a high school education.[11] Statistically, the foreign-born have somewhat lower education levels than the Swedish-born. At the same time there is only a small difference in the proportion of the segment with higher education, 41% of the Swedish-born compared to 39% of the foreign-born.[12] However, there is also a large proportion with very low educational levels among foreign-born groups, where 10% within the age-group 16-64 (alternatively 25-64, depending on statistical data available) only have primary/lower-secondary education of less than 9 years duration. The equivalent share among Swedish-born is only 1%, but it should be noted that there are huge differences in the educational levels of various groups of immigrants.[13] Women to a greater extent have higher educations than men in both groups. As to their background, more of those from North America and the EU have higher educations, while a larger portion of those born in Africa and Asia have only pre-high school educations. There are also substantial differences between regions and within countries.

There are wide differences between individuals and from one migrant group to another, depending on their starting point. The particular situation in the countries of origin can play a key role. It should be noted that there are substantial differences among various immigrant groups that may be situated on the extremes of the education scale: some very low, sometimes even lacking any formal education at all. This is the case with some Eritreans, even though there may also be others who are very well-educated within the same group. This also applies to, e.g., Burundians and Somalis. Other migrant groups, for example, from Iran and Iraq have, to a very large extent, post-secondary levels of education. Beyond that, statistics also confirm clear diffe-

7) Nya regler för arbetskraftsinvandring Prop. 2007/08:147.
8) Statistics Sweden, The largest population increase since 1861, https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/population/population-composition/population-statistics/pong/statistical-news/population-and-population-changes-in-sweden-2016/.
9) Statistics Sweden, Invandring till Sverige, 2019-02-21 https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/sverige-i-siffror/manniskorna-i-sverige/invandring-till-sverige/
10) Migration Authority, https://www.migrationsverket.se/Om-Migrationsverket/Statistik/Asyl.html.
11) Ekonomifakta, https://www.ekonomifakta.se/Fakta/Arbetsmarknad/Integration/Utbildningsniva/



GRAPH 3A: LEVEL OF EDUCATION AMONG SWEDEN- AND FOREIGN-BORN AGED 25-64, 2015, IN PER CENT %
Source: Statistics Sweden/SCB, in: https://www.migrationsinfo.se/befolkning/utbildningsniva/



GRAPH 3B: LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF THE SWEDISH POPULATION 1990-2017
Source: Statistics Sweden/Every 4th person in Sweden has a higher education
https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/sverige-i-siffror/utbildning-jobb-och-pengar/befolkningens-utbildning/

rences between highly-educated foreign-born compared to highly-educated Sweden-born, both with regard to actual employment (6 out of 10 compared to 9 out of 10) and use of actual competence when employed where about 50% had a job that wholly or at least in large part was relevant to their education as compared to 79% among the Swedish born. In addition about 30% of the foreign-born had an employment not requiring a higher education as compared to 6% among the Swedish born. (SCB 2016:3, p.12, 14).[14]

In addition, regional and local issues regarding equality also need to be considered, for instance for groups originating in countries where girls are habitually excluded from education (e.g. Afghanistan), which leads to imbalances in educational levels of migrants from various countries. The contrast can also be inferred by comparing Graphs 3a and 3b. A com-

parison indicates that lower levels of education are decreasing within the Swedish population, while remaining higher in the foreign-born segment. The difference is comparatively small in the segments with higher levels of education between both Swedish and foreign-born.

5.2.2 Groups and categories of migrants

Migrants in Sweden originate from about 200 countries "but 49% of all foreign-born come from only 10 countries" (Strömbäck 2016). As seen in Table 4a, persons born in Syria constituted the largest number of foreign born persons in Sweden in 2017. The table also shows the most dominant groups. The relative dominance of certain groups reflects in particular ways the historical development of transnational migration to Sweden. Usually this can be connected to the initial reasons for migration – and the migrants' motivation to "integrate" and stay, or to just adopt a strategy of more or less temporary adaptation to circumstances while awaiting a chance to return or other changes in residential status.

For instance, political asylum seekers may in some cases live for many years with the hope of radical political changes in their country of origin, and a consequent return (e.g. this presumably applied concerning many of the male Chileans who immigrated after 1973), which motivates a diasporization (Cronemo 2012, Olsson. 2009). At the same time, mothers tended to ensure the continuity of family life and bread-winning: they learned Swedish, made efforts to find work, and made sure that children were in every way provided for – not in the least, with a proper education.

Establishing the number of migrants in Sweden depends on which definitions are used: foreign-born, persons with two foreign-born parents alternatively one Swedish and one foreign-born parent; naturalized, children of naturalized parents; first or second-generation migrants. As in much of Europe there is a tendency in the Swedish media and among policymakers to refer to the children of immigrants as second-generation immigrants; a terminology seems to

Category (residence permits)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Work, of which	**5985**	**6257**	**9859**	**14513**	**17954**	**16373**	**17877**	**19936**	**19292**	**15872**	**16975**
– employees	3135	3567	4829	7508	14905	14001	15158	17011	15974	12521	13789
– researchers	341	377	396	613	933	883	870	1219	1129	1126	1083
– seasonal workers	496	70	2358	3747	2)						
– trainees, e.g. au-pair	609	592	587	653	933	883	870	1219	1129	1126	1083
– others	1404	1651	1689	1992	1466	996	1459	1250	1751	1732	1636
Study, of which	**6837**	**7331**	**8920**	**11186**	**13487**	**14188**	**6836**	**7092**	**7559**	**9267**	**9410**
– for PhD studies								811	979	1247	1202
EU/EEA	**18069**	**20461**	**19387**	**19398**	**17606**	**18480**	**23226**	**25501**	**20712**	**7394**	**2791**
– Employees	7414	9020	8189	7881	5857	6984	9309	9610	7850	2489	
– Self-employed	1257	1144	695	488	418	522	617	511	323	81	
– Family reunification	4736	5679	6350	6748	6562	6032	7700	7310	5489	2109	967
– Students	3986	3489	2825	2953	3230	3365	3511	5911	4889	955	
– Others	676	1129	1328	1328	1539	1577	2089	2159	2161	1760	1824
Family reunification	**22713**	**27291**	**29515**	**33687**	**38332**	**30287**	**32469**	**41156**	**40026**	**42435**	**43414**
– Family members	19904	22869	21284	22519	24809	21460	20835	22682	18541	18079	15637
– Refugee family members	2004	3799	7691	10665	9273	3166	3037	7897	10673	13100	16251
– Work permit family members					3628	5211	8242	9679	9625	9698	10023
– Work permit students/ family members								615	944	1337	1348
Adoption	**805**	**623**	**540**	**503**	**622**	**450**	**355**	**283**	**243**	**221**	**155**
Asylum, humanitarian etc.	**8859**	**25096**	**18414**	**11237**	**11265**	**12130**	**12726**	**17405**	**28998**	**35642**	**36645**
– Geneva Convention	790	963	1113	1934	1824	2304	2870	4617	7646	11341	13552
– Subsidiary protection	1174	3728	10208	5278	6164	6814	6148	9095	17227	20023	18690
– Humanitarian reasons	2487	3657	3938	1571	995	860	1345	1328	1378	1685	1588
– Quota refugees	1263	1626	1845	2209	1936	1786	1896	1853	2187	1971	1880
– Temporary law	2510	14823									
– Others	635	299	1310	245	346	366	467	512	560	622	935

TABLE 3: FOREIGN POPULATION IN SWEDEN, ACCORDING TO REASONS FOR BEING GRANTED RESIDENTIAL RIGHTS: 2005–2015

Source: Swedish Migration Agency/Migrationsverket

http://www.migrationsverket.se/English/About-the-Migration-Agency/Facts-and-statistics-/Statistics/Overview-and-time-series.html

support the idea of societal exclusion concerning migrants as well as their children. Assuming this is not intentional, possibly policymakers and others, to the extent that a term is needed at all, should use the term second generation Swedes. This would underline the idea that everyone living in Sweden essentially has equal rights, opportunities and duties (SOU 2005:56).

According to the Aliens Act there are a number of reasons for being granted a residence permit in Sweden. The variety of reasons can be seen in table 3.

5.2.3 Immigrant groups

Finnish people used to be the largest immigrant group in Sweden for many years, but after 2016, Syrians became the largest group of foreign born with 172 258 persons. They are now followed by Finnish (150 877) and Iraqi (140 830) persons. Other larger groups originate from Poland (91 180), Iran (74 098), Somalia (68 369), Yugoslavia (65 877) and Bosnia & Hercegovina (58 880), as well as Germany (50 863) and Afghanistan (43 991) (see Table 4a below). The number of migrants in Sweden has varied over the years, as have countries of origin. To better understand the structure and development of migration one needs to understand both the internal and external factors that influence migration processes and migrants' motives for migration, as well as the legal provisions that limit the granting of residential rights. Historically, Swedish migration patterns reflect cyclical economic changes and global trends, especially since Sweden can be an attractive migration alternative due to its relatively generous reception system. See Tables 4a and 4b below concerning the most usual countries of immigration to Sweden.

Comparing Tables 4a and 4b, it can be noted that the size ranking of the most commonly represented groups remains rather constant. There is a continued high proportion for countries that have generated refugees and asylum seekers,

		Number of immigrants				
Rank 2015	Country of Birth	2017 (Total)	2015	2014	Percent change %	Rank 2014
	TOTAL		134 240	126 966	6	.
1	Syria	172 258 (1)	30 590	26 113	17	(1)
2	Sweden		14 580	15 194	-4	(2)
3	Eritrea		6 838	5 322	28	(3)
4	Poland	91 180 (4)	5 596	5 138	9	(4)
5	Iraq	140 830 (3)	4 082	3 391	20	(7)
6	India		3 601	3 069	17	(8)
7	Somalia	68 369 (6)	3 531	4 372	-19	(5)
8	Afghanistan	43 991 (10)	2 974	3 436	-13	(6)
9	Finland	150 877 (2)	2 733	2 573	6	(9)
10	China		2 534	2 572	-1	(10)
11	Germany	50 863 (9)	2 428	2 311	5	(12)
12	Romania		2 305	1 990	16	(14)
13	Iran	74 098 (5)	2 054	2 489	-17	(11)
14	Norway		1 998	2 041	-2	(13)
15	Denmark		1 853	1 776	4	(16)
16	UK & N. Ireland		1 813	1 966	-8	(15)
17	USA		1 565	1 758	-11	(17)
18	Turkey		1 495	1 436	4	(19)
19	Thailand		1 481	1 757	-16	(18)
20	Greece		1 252	1 243	1	(21)
	Yugoslavia	65 877 (7)				
	Bosnia & Hercegovina	58 880 (8)				
	Other countries (Total)		38 937	37 019	5	.

TABLE 4A: IMMIGRATION TO SWEDEN 2014-2015 - 20 MOST USUAL COUNTRIES OF BIRTH FOR IMMIGRANTS IN 2015

Source: Statistics Sweden/Migration Agency (Migrationsverket)
(2017 country of birth data added by author for comparison)

Birth Country	First half-year 2018			First half-year 2017		
	Immigration	Emigration	Net	Immigration	Emigration	Net
All countries-Total	61 698	22 119	39 579	63 996	20 252	43 744
Syria	8 199	231	7 968	12 480	110	12 370
Sweden	6 078	7 543	1 465	6 876	7 241	365
India	3 270	814	2 456	2 155	773	1 382
Afghanistan	3 256	70	3 186	3 699	73	3 626
Iraq	2 591	702	1 889	3 644	677	2 967
Iran	1 997	261	1 736	1 680	285	1 395
Poland	1 904	920	984	1 982	755	1 227
Eritrea	1 731	54	1 677	1 558	44	1 514
Somalia	1 638	321	1 317	1 401	210	1 191
China	1 099	534	565	923	433	490
Other countries	29 935	10 669	19 266	27 598	9 651	17 947

TABLE 4B: IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF BIRTH, FIRST HALF-YEAR 2017 AND 2018

Source: Statistics Sweden, Population statistics 1st half year 2018/Statistic news 2018.08*

Table 4b shows the ten countries of birth with the most immigration to Sweden during the first half year of 2018

https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter-amne/befolkning/befolkningens-sammansattning/befolkningsstatistik/pong/statistiknyhet/befolkningsstatistik-1a-halvaret-2018/

both in the past and more recently (e.g. Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq) with differences indicative of a certain structural shift reflecting the nature of reasons for immigration, e.g. higher intra-European migration (e.g. Germany, Poland) but also a higher proportion of skilled worker migration from e.g. Asia (India, China). Concerning the high proportion in absolute numbers in relation to the added comparison figures for 2017 in Table 4a, note that earlier trends generally led to a constantly higher proportion of the population with that ethnic origin (e.g. Finland, Yugoslavia).

- CHAPTER 6 -

REALITY ON THE GROUND

HOW MIGRANTS AND MIGRATION CONTRIBUTE TO DEVELOPMENT

6.1
Contributions to countries of destination

THERE IS A GENERAL CONSENSUS that Sweden's development would not have been the same without its immigrants' contributions (Strömbäck 2016). This contribution particularly intensified in modern times. Demographically, immigration contributed to a rejuvenation of the population, in particular in its working age segment, preventing at times what otherwise would have been a negative development of the population. Contrary to various negative public perceptions, migrants have generally made substantial contributions over the years to Sweden in a wide range of realms, from the economy, to welfare, to culture and to politics. In a relatively recent study of immigration research the author states: "The central point that comes through in the research is that there is not and does not have to be any conflict between showing solidarity and the national self-interest. It is not just immigrants who need Sweden, it is also Sweden that needs immigration" (Strömbäck 2015, p. 8).

Another recent literature study points out that immigration has positive effects on innovation, productivity, trade and economic growth (PM 2018:07, p. 3). While there is an employment gap between the foreign born and Swedish born, it is important to note that most immigrants work. Also, to a greater extent than the Swedish born, they work in fields that are not equivalent to their level of education. The most common jobs for immigrant women and men are in the health care, elderly care, hotel, restaurant and cleaning sectors.[1]

Sweden's main economic activity centres – which are where most migrants reside - are primarily its three largest cities: Stockholm, Malmö and Gothenburg. Demographically, it is a general phenomenon that "metropolitan areas, suburban municipalities and larger towns are growing, while the populations of smaller and sparsely populated municipalities are declining" (Ds 2013:19, p.128), an aspect that migration also can have a positive impact on. At the same time immigrants in general are drawn to the larger urban areas. This seems to be a result of the economic opportunities. At the same time, in some cases, an inflow of migrants may be crucial for the development – and sometimes even survival - of smaller communities, often suffering from a chronic decrease of the population, with a cohort of negative follow-up impacts on local planning. With a constant tendency for younger generations to choose to move to larger, more urbanized areas such as Stockholm, Malmö, Gothenburg, or even medium-size towns like the university cities of Lund and Uppsala, some areas by definition are more scarcely inhabited. As a rule, the further north, the scarcer the local population, and thus this demographic challenge. The addition of migrants can help to revive at least some local economies.

Table 5 provides information about the relative rate of employment and unemployment concerning migrants from different parts of the world. People from Africa and Asia

Birthplace/part of the World	Occupational degree/Employment rate	Relative unemployment rate	Outside of labour force*
Europe	57.4%	10.4%	35.9%
Africa	54.2%	24.7%	28.0%
Asia	51.7%	22.2%	33.6%
South America	66.7%	13.8%	22.7%
North America	61.9%	14.9%	27.3%
Rest of the world	63.2%	9.8%	29.9%

TABLE 5: OCCUPATIONAL DEGREE (SYSSELSÄTTNINGSGRAD), UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR FORCE FIGURES (RELATIVE FIGURES)/ IN PERCENT %, ACCORDING TO AGE (15–74 YEARS OLD), OCCUPATIONAL DEGREE, AND BIRTHPLACE, BY 2009

Source: SCB/Statistics Sweden – Arbetskraftsundersökningarna, AKU/Labour Market Surveys, 2009, in: Dingu-Kyrklund/IOM 2013:144

1) SCB, 2015-06-30, Utrikesfödda oftare mer välutbildade än deras yrke kräver, https://www.scb.se/sv_/Hitta-statistik/Artiklar/Utrikesfodda-oftare-mer-valutbildade-an-deras-yrke-kraver/.

clearly have higher rates of unemployment compared to people from other regions of the world. While the figures are a bit old, the general trend would be the same although the unemployment figures are presumably even higher concerning the influx of refugees from Asia during the past 4-5 years.

As has been concluded by Statistics Sweden in its 2017 report, the matching between the skills of the foreign born and the labour market has not functioned very well. The report points out that length of time in Sweden and whether the education is Swedish or not makes a difference. Persons with a residence of 20 years in Sweden and a Swedish degree are those who are most likely to have employment that matches their education. Nevertheless, even those persons do not achieve the same employment rates as persons born in Sweden (SCB 2017b, p. 43).

At the same time, several reports by Reforminstitutet reject some of the more common myths regarding the economic consequences of migration. Among these, Eriksson and Fölster, in their study on: "Consequences of immigration on economic growth!," note that whether the consequences on the state budget are negative or positive, depends to a large extent on how well the labour market is accepting immigrants, something which was confirmed by both Swedish research, in particular Jan Ekberg's studies and the OECD's 2014 analysis. Ekberg took into account the amount of immigration, the age of the migrants and the degree of integration on the labour market. The study concluded that Sweden was one of the OECD countries that had the most to gain from increased labour market participation by immigrants. (OECD 2014, Eriksson/Fölster 2014 p. 3).

The same study (Eriksson/Fölster 2014, p. 3) also points out that concentrating only on the state-financial effects of immigration risks missing a wider perspective with regard to potential growth effects such as the impact on increased exports, increased specialisation on the labour market as well as counteracting shortages of competence and wider labour shortages. These are factors that several international studies show as positive growth effects related to immigration. The potential exclusionary and negative effects of local labour by migrants are also considered. The study concludes that even if such an effect would occur, it would be counteracted by the increase in productivity that migration leads to. This effect has been proven by e.g. a study indicating a clear connection between an increase of non-local born employment participation within several areas of employment in the USA's manufacturing industry, where 1% increase of the migrants' increase in labour participation results to a 4% general increase within the entire labour force. In fact, the authors estimate, taking into account the long term effects, that without immigration Sweden would have had about three per cent lower wages and salaries on the labour market (Eriksson, M./Fölster, S. 2014, p. 3-4).

A study on the economic effects of integration and immigration pointed out that an increased integration of foreign-born on the labour market creates positive effects in the public budget – which for Sweden was calculated as equivalent of 1.4 % of the GNP for 2001. The authors also state that the effects are in fact actually larger as the children of immigrants were not included in that calculation. The same authors further note that an increase of the Swedish labour force through the integration of persons with an immigrant background would contribute to a competitive advantage. Another general conclusion is that the actual question is not whether to prioritize immigration or integration in order to preserve welfare (levels) and create growth, but that both (elements) are necessary to that effect (Rauhut & Blomberg 2003:5, p. 5).

The UK newspaper *The Independent*, on 6 October 2016, published an article with the headline "How immigration is fuelling Sweden's economic boom". It makes the case for the positive effects of immigration on the Swedish economy, even given the fact that there can be short-term difficulties. The article refers to a leading economist, Jonathan Portes, who states that reducing immigration "reduces economic growth" and that the Swedish experience is living proof that given a long-term integration strategy combatting the pitfalls of exclusion means that successful integration of refugees is not just a burden, but increases growth. The best option is to enable migrants' education and contribute to their professional and linguistic knowledge and development sufficiently to be able to match their capabilities to shortage-affected areas of competence – i.e. (local) needs, whether the reference is to persons with higher or lower levels of education (Witton, Bridie (2016), Several studies corroborate this perspective in various ways (e.g. Strömbäck 2015, 2016; Lundqvist 2004).

6.1.1 Labour Market Contributions; General features

Immigration can contribute to reducing labour market shortages and bottlenecks under appropriate conditions. This was the key contribution of the post WWII labour migration to the Swedish economy. This was largely the motivating factor behind the 2008 policy liberalising labour migration again. It was assumed that the demand for labour could help to correct the accumulated structural paradox of the Swedish labour market after the initial post-WWII boom leading to Sweden's unprecedented development. There is a mix of professions requiring different levels of education that can be seen in Table 6.

Occupational group /Professional area	of which applications from the employees abroad	of which applications from person in Sweden with a negative decision that came into force	of which applications from person in Sweden who studies	of which applications from person in Sweden with visa	Total
Work not demanding a particular professional formation (SSYK96)	2				2
Managerial positions	458	2	5		465
Military professions	7				7
Service, [medical] care- and sales work (SSYK96)	1				1
Service-, [medical] care- and sales/retail professions	1312	164	26	11	1 513
Professions within administration and customer service	215	44	44	1	304
Professions within constructions and manufacturing	681	130	2	26	839
Professions within agriculture, gardening, forestry and fisheries	417	11	1	5	434
Professions machine manufacturing and transportation, etc.	100	31	4	2	137
Professions demanding specialized college/ higher education	5713	12	494	16	6 235
Professions demanding higher education or similar competence	887	16	77	2	982
Professions demanding shorter education or introduction	3918	543	125		4 586
Other	45	2			47
TOTAL	13756	955	778	63	15 552

TABLE 6: WORK PERMITS GRANTED 2017*
Source: Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket)
*) The categorization system changed in 2014, which explains why earlier figures are not always comparable in exact terms.

a. Participation in the 'labour market'

Facilitating immigrant integration into Swedish society as well as on the Swedish labour market has been a recurring theme in the political discourse, as well as in the society at large. There are both formal and informal elements that facilitate or impede the process of integration on the labour market. Multiple factors influence the degree of success in finding a job – at all, and/or (potentially more importantly) consistent with one's competence and qualifications. The time of arrival, family circumstances, level of education, linguistic competence in Swedish and what is often referred to as cultural competence, and not in the least having (or not) a social network can play an important role. According to table 7 on the following page, immigrants are highly represented in various occupations such as pizza and other fast food services, cleaning, restaurants, transportation services. Very generally these are basically various types of personal services. It should also be noted that according to Statistics Sweden, the term 'employee' here also includes self-employed persons who run their operations as a limited company. This can apply in particular to taxi drivers and beauty professionals. Even if the table provides an indication of the overrepresentation of migrants in the lesser skilled occupations, the figures clearly indicate that 1/ most go to work daily and 2/ as pointed out various authors, Sweden could not function without these workers. One figure that stands out as being a bit different in the table is the overrepresentation of immigrants among PhD students. Finally it is worthwhile comparing this table to Table 7a (next spread) from which a somewhat similar situation can be gleaned from Table 7a concerning occupations held by persons running their own businesses.

b. Supply of migrant skills

A main concern for Sweden is an expected shortage of qualified labour in the foreseeable future, when older generations are due to retire and the native-born may not be

Occupation[1]	Total	Number of native born	Number of foreign born	Foreign born, percent
Pizza makers and fast food preparers	3 600	770	2 830	79
Maid, nanny and related workers	3 270	1 020	2 250	69
Translators, interpreters and other linguists	3 000	1 230	1 770	59
Cleaners and helpers in offices, hotels and other establishments	73 420	31 330	42 090	57
PhD Students	9 730	4 800	4 930	51
Bus and tram drivers	23 830	12 300	11 530	48
Taxi, car, and van drivers	11 330	5 990	5 330	47
Machine operators, bleaching, dyeing and cleaning	3 030	1 620	1 410	46
Choreographers and dancers	370	210	170	45
Research assistants	2 870	1 620	1 240	43
Butchers, fishmongers and related food preparers	3 400	1 930	1 470	43
Cleaning supervisors and housekeepers	2 450	1 430	1 020	42
Beauty and body therapists professionals not elsewhere classified	890	520	370	42
Machine operators, meat- and fish-processing	4 460	2 630	1 840	41
Restaurant and kitchen helpers	68 140	41 580	26 560	39
Total	4 270 900	3 537 000	733 900	17

TABLE 7: THE 15 OCCUPATIONS WITH THE LARGEST PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN BORN EMPLOYEES, 2017

Source: Statistics Sweden 2017, Swedish Occupational Register 2017.

1) According to the Swedish Standard Classification of Occupations 2012 (SSYK2012) at a four-digit level. Total number of persons with occupational data. The figures are rounded to the nearest 10.

Occupation	Number		Percent (%)	
	Utrikes	Inrikes	Utrikes	Inrikes
Hairdresser	2800	8700	24	76
Cleaner	2700	1500	64	36
Taxi driver etc.	2600	900	74	26
Retail sales managers/section managers	2500	4500	36	64
Construction workers etc.	1800	4000	31	69
Pizza bakers etc.	1500	200	90	10
Carpenters etc.	1200	6400	16	84
Chefs and other restaurant services	1200	800	62	38
Mechanics	800	3100	21	79
Restaurant workers	800	500	60	40

TABLE 7A: THE 10 MOST COMMON OCCUPATIONS FOR FOREIGN BORN PERSONS RUNNING THEIR OWN BUSINESS, 16-74 YEARS OLD, 2017

Source: Statistics Sweden 2017, Swedish Occupational Register 2017, p. 12.

sufficient to cover the need. Considering, for instance, that the demographic trends had been negative in 2013 in 84 out of Sweden's 290 municipalities (Strömbäck 2015, p 21), immigration appears as a viable alternative even in the least optimistic scenarios given that only part of this potential has been used up until now.

There is a recognition in Sweden that there will be a shortfall in concerning labour needs given Sweden's aging population. There will be an increasing demand partly related to retirements but also an increased demand concerning various skills. Education will be a key concerning meeting the demands, while at the same time it is expected that the shortfall will be dealt with by among other factors, immigration (SCB 2017a).

In a 2019 study, the Swedish Public Employment Service, quite simply concluded that Sweden was facing a labour shortage over the coming years through 2030. This was related to among other things the number of people that were going to being reaching the age of 80 in the coming years. To deal with this, the Service pointed out three primary potential solutions. An increase in productivity could probably be achieved, at least incrementally. A higher usage of underemployed capacity, particularly among women with an immigrant background. An increase in labour participation by older people also fell within this category. Finally, the Service foresaw a need for a net migration rate of about 30 000 – 60 000 persons per year. None of these was expected to be sufficient on its own (AF 2019, p. 4-6).

In a globalization context, it is a fair assumption to expect that migrants – whatever the reasons for their migration (seeking shelter, work, love or studying) – will be persons with a strong motivation to succeed (Strömbäck 2015), considering the efforts that have already been expended for a better life. In the context of harder international competition, migrants not only bring their work capacity and motivation, but also language skills, cultural and business competence, knowledge about how other countries and their markets function, and an understanding about how people in other environments think. Many of the research programmes financed by the EU during recent years – especially the Marie Curie mobility programme, but also the Science for Refugees programme, for instance - are built on the concept of ensuring top competence by making EU-countries attractive both for intra-European and global movement of competence, enabling talented persons to establish themselves professionally.

c. Strengthening demand for migrant skills?

What has been observed in the Swedish labour market is the decreasing demand for low-skilled work. On a positive note, statistics show a continuous decrease of the less well-educated population, local and foreign-born, which improves everybody's chances on the labour market. As Sweden is highly technological, the labour market is highly specialized. Statistically, more than a quarter of the population (about 27%) is highly educated.
Debates about integrating migrants on the labour market lead to numerous opinions, suggestions and further debates. Apprenticeships, enabling a more solid knowledge of Swedish as a professional language, completing or/and validating one's education – especially higher education – are among the usual proposals that come up in various contexts. The question remains how to make the best use of this latent resource as well as what is the hinder.

One semi-controversial proposal put into place a few years ago by the conservative government was subsidising household services through targeted tax-reductions (RUT) introduced in 2007 (Nyberg 2015). This led to the starting up of a large number of cleaning firms – many by migrants, often women. Migrant women are also numerous among the workers. This example also was used as anti-unemployment argument. Statistical estimates indicate the employment of about 73 000 cleaners, with about 40 percent of newly-established enterprises being run by foreign-born women. This means that there is an overall overrepresentation of foreign-born persons in this field (Nyberg 2015 p.232-3).

While in some ways RUT can be deemed a success, as it is providing contract-based jobs to persons at the lower-end of the labour market. At the same time, it may however serve to consolidate a rather insecure position that does not necessarily entail sustainable long-term or/and fulltime employment and may have a less positive effect in the long run, directing available funds in a less than optimum manner.

Other subsidies, directed to newcomers (during their first two years after arrival), the so-called "step-in" and "new start" jobs, show some positive traits. In the long-run, evaluations show rather inconclusive results as these jobs do not really provide an advantage in e.g. gaining Swedish language competence or enhanced productivity (RiR 2013, cited in OECD 2016:137). An issue that arises in preliminary discussions with migrants and trade unions is that more research should also be done on the extent to which such subsidies may have attracted less serious potential employers. Some,

after having used the subsidized period of time, never intended to offer continued employment to the trainees working for them, but rather preferred to take in another subsidized person. Unless the subsidized period of time is followed by a mandatory minimum period of actual employment, with a standard contract, subsidizing employers may have an effect comparable to palliative healthcare: it may alleviate the symptoms for a while but does not lead to a cure.

6.1.2 Participation in business activity

Table 7A provides some insight into immigrant participation in the business sector. To some extent the figures reflect the occupational distribution seen above in Table 7.

A recurring theme in Swedish research is the importance of businesses run by persons with a foreign background. Here the term refers to persons born outside of Sweden or having two parents born outside the country. Exactly how many people are employed by businesses run by them is unclear but the figure is estimated to be about 200-250 000 persons. Businesses run by persons with a foreign background thus contribute to increased employment among persons with a Swedish background as well as a foreign background. At the same time, the group persons with a foreign background is very heterogeneous and there are clear differences between groups coming from different countries. In particular, there are high odds that persons with a background in Lebanon, Syria and Turkey will have businesses; among men with a background in these countries the odds are five times higher that they will be business owners than for men with a Swedish background. There was also a substantial increase in this tendency between 1993 and 2007 (Strömbäck 2015, p 36-37).

As to different motivations for starting a business, the risk of unemployment is a much more important motivation for persons with a foreign background as opposed to persons with a Swedish background. In other words, the driving force is more based on the idea of necessity rather than opportunity. At the same time, growth is larger among their businesses, particularly concerning the so-called second generation. Immigrants also tend to be involved to a greater extent in areas of business that are active in international markets (see e.g. SOU 2005:56 and Strömbäck 2015 p 37).

Immigrants and persons with immigrant background work practically in all sectors of activity, with variations as related to the field of activity and degree of (un)employment dependent on a multitude of factors (see above). Among these, factors related to educational background are of particular importance, especially the degree and extent of recognition of professional qualifications (formal and informal), individual motivation and aptitude to learn the local language (Swedish in this case), but also the potential for discriminatory treatment – structural as well as well as systemic.

Many migrants start successful businesses, bringing a significant contribution to the development of the Swedish economy, and not in the least to its innovative potential as well as a higher employment rate, as employers themselves. Special mention should be made of young female business owners with a migrant background. They distinguish themselves as being even more enterprising, ambitious and innovative than their male counterparts. Moreover, they do not get discouraged by a shortage of capital either, even though that may be an obstacle in their capacity to develop new products and services (Tillväxtverket 2015). In his book "Without immigration, Sweden comes to a standstill", Strömbäck notes that 15% of all companies in Sweden are run by persons with a migrant background, and annually about 20% of new companies are founded by migrants. He also describes numerous examples of immigrant entrepreneurs with very diverse backgrounds, but with the common trait of becoming successful in business (Strömbäck 2016 p. 42).

Adapting the work supply to the demand by allowing migration to compensate for the shortage in labour is both rational and profitable, requiring comparatively less investment than developing new competence from scratch. As in the past, migration can once again provide a needed solution. Several studies (Cerna 2012, Emilsson 2014, 2016; EP 2017; Bevelander & Irasforza 2014, 2017; AF 2018) concur in the general opinion that labour migration is the only way to compensate for (future) labour shortages.

Nonetheless, that apparent consensus does not exclude differences of opinion as to how and what should be done. As an illustration, the website "cities of migration", dedicated to noting and encouraging immigrants' entrepreneurial ideas and initiative, published an interview in 2014 with Maroun Aoun, CEO of the Swedish Association of Ethnic Entrepreneurs. He noted both the particular importance of entrepreneurs with foreign backgrounds to the national economy of Sweden as well as the hurdles they have to face. Maroun Aoun noted the importance of ethnic entrepreneurs' particularly as a "key to international markets" through their language, culture knowledge and their networks in other countries, which "removes many barriers to export", as well as initiatives like creating "a corporate culture that offers equitable business opportunities for everyone". Statistically, "about 1.8 million people with an immigrant background live in Sweden", and "they tend to start businesses more often than the native-born". Further, he stated that "there are around 70 000 migrant-owned businesses that together employ about 250 000 people" – something that should also be considered in proportion to the about 10 million inhabitants which is the total population of Sweden. In the same context, Maroun Aoun further noticed that "the Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth" has found that 22% of immigrant-owned businesses target their goods and services, at least partially, to the international market, compared to 15% by Swedish-born owners.

6.1.3 Contributions towards Sweden's welfare system and a viable national social security system

Immigrants play a key role not just on the labour market, but also in providing support to the development of Sweden as a welfare state and its system. An OECD report on labour migration and immigrant integration in Sweden noted that Sweden, with a "large immigrant population and longstanding … advanced policies" "stands at the frontier of policy development in the field of integration"among OECD countries (OECD 2016:34).

Despite constant efforts to improve the effectiveness of immigrant integration policies and the coordination among responsible bodies, stakeholders and beneficiaries, the potential outcomes have yet to be fully realized or understood. In a policy brief, DELMI Report (2016:8) on the "Economic effects of immigration", the authors note the growing importance of (understanding) the effects immigration has had on Sweden's economic development. They also note the extent to which previous forecasts failed to predict the actual (much larger) extent of immigrant intake, which impacted the population structure to enable better predictions but also better ways (i.e. policies and practices) to "handle the challenges" (p.1).

Earlier prognoses indicated an immigration rate of 15 000 persons a year, while the actual rate was around 50 000 persons a year during 2000-2015 (with more than triple that intake in 2015). An important point is realizing to which extent high levels of immigration leading to an increase in population between 2000-2015 and after actually improved future prospects for Sweden. In particular when considering that there was an increase in the segment of the population aged 20-40, i.e. of working age, which improved the correlation between the population of working age and the non-working extremes of the population pyramid (aged 0-14 & 65+), at an annual growth rate 0.5% higher than expected. A prerequisite is (of course) ensuring proper use and integration of newcomers, enabling them to participate in the labour market.

An important conclusion based on historical and previous economic development is that large expenditure needs should not necessarily be seen as a "threat to central government finances". The authors note that "large net immigration has normally been followed by … strong economic growth" (DELMI 2016:8, p.3-4). Investments in "infrastructure, housing, education, security and social measures" enable migrants old and new and nationals to realize their aspirations (with regard to work, family life and housing) and better contribute to a positive development for the entire country. Sweden has thereby been able to avoid being a country with a predominantly aging population and instead become a more balanced society. However, on a different point, one negative impact may be higher housing costs (DELMI 2016:8.).

The main limitation of this study (DELMI 2016:8) is that its narrow concentration on demographic aspects leaves out other aspects that are equally relevant such as the cultural contribution of migrants – with seldom discussed benefits, not even the economic ones. Even statistically, the benefits of migration are broader when more than just raw immigration data is taken into consideration. There are also a number of individual variables to be taken into account, including those reflecting, for instance, economic participation (e.g. taxation revenue, labour market participation in a variety of forms – including temporary, seasonal and other forms). What should particularly be noted here as a direct effect of immigration is on the one hand the demographic aspect, counteracting an otherwise negative population trend, and at the *same* time, the economic implications, through the sizeable contribution to the labour market needs of the country. Moreover, the culturally enriching aspects of immigration should also be recognized, with a multitude of manifestations, from the initial adoption of "immigrant foods", to the innumerable aspects of direct cultural contributions in a variety of fields, becoming an intrinsic part of the Swedish culture. Today some of these are even embraced as "genuinely Swedish", often meaning there is little understanding of their actual origins.

Beyond short-term financial implications, another key long-term factor that needs to be taken into account relates to the broader effects concerning the improved national ability to meet future challenges, regardless of the issue of international migration. Phenomenon such as "demographic developments and meeting the competence demands and the need of competitiveness in an increasingly globalized world" need to be seen in a broader perspective (Strömbäck 2015:5). These aspects are often ignored in the public debate, which invariably focuses on direct costs related to migration.

Working in Sweden automatically brings contributions to social security system – with everything that it entails including the pension system. Considering the general participation of migrants in the country's economic activity, the migrant contribution to the social security system is sizeable, proportional to their number and consequently is an important general contribution to the national economy's development. What should be pointed out is that beyond the skewed present public discourse, migrants constantly generated more gain for Sweden than what they actually consumed – or "cost" through their economic activity. Not only did it cover the real needs of the national economy, it also generated national and local income through taxation as well as increased economic activity through their and their families' consumption.

In 2015 Scocco and Andersson released a report analysing the effects of immigration on public finances in Sweden during the years 1950-2014. By examining the level of

employment, public revenues and expenses across a person's life cycle, in combination with the demographic effects of immigration, they calculated the effect on public finances. According to them, Sweden's post-war immigration led to an average of SEK 65 billion in tax revenue annually over the period studied. Their conclusion is basically in the title of the report:"900 billion reasons to appreciate immigration". The report generated substantial controversy among at least some economists and within the media. The media reporting was both positive and negative (Scocco and Andersson 2015).

6.1.4 Contribution to community, social, cultural, as well as economic development

A closer look at the Swedish society will reveal substantial numbers of migrants having contributed to the development of Sweden throughout the years, not only during contemporary times but also historically. In an article entitled "Sweden's Economy is Getting a Lift from Migrants" in Bloomberg Businessweek in 2018, Rafaela Lindeberg wrote about the important contribution of migrants to the country's development. The article points out that growth is running well above the rest of the EU, "testifying to the country's greater success at getting newcomers into labour market" (Lindeberg 2018).

The article describes for example Hussam Al-Homsi, a Syrian refugee who arrived in 2015 who has achieved relatively rapid success. Nevertheless, in 2018 he belongs to a demographic group categorized as "problem" in the political discourse, while other voices (better documented) conclude that the same group of refugees and migrants "has produced some of the highest growth rates in Europe and will also help address the challenges of an otherwise aging population" (Lindeberg 2018).

The article portrays several stories of well-educated migrants such as Al-Homsi (MBA – now working at Deloitte Touche in Stockholm), Farzad Golchin (founder and CEO of Novare Potential, a recruiting company) and Ismaiel Alkadro, (vascular surgeon from Syria now working at a hospital in Eskilstuna), all telling about how difficult it is to get a job. Even getting an interview for a job might prove difficult. The article also tells about highly qualified professionals working in other, lower-qualified fields (e.g. a doctor who started a pizzeria).

In the cultural field we find a significant number of successful artists. Özz Nûjen was 8 years old when he arrived in Sweden as a refugee of Kurdish origin. Today he is a well-known actor and stand-up comedian. Another example is Fares, a successful Swedish-Lebanese actor and film director of Assyrian/Syrian descent.

Today, the number of politicians with immigrant backgrounds in high-level posts is on the rise. That includes several ministers serving in Swedish governments for different parties, such as: Nyamko Sabuni (Liberals) – former political exile from Zaire (Minister for gender equality and integration 2006-2013); Mehmet Kaplan (Greens) of Turkish origin, (Minister for Housing 2014-2016); Ibrahim Baylan (Social Democrat), of Turkish Assyrian/Syrian origin (currently the Minister for Enterprise); Aida Hadzialik (Social Democrat) born 1992 in Bosnia-Hercegovina, (Minister for Higher Education and Research 2014-2016 – youngest minister ever); Ardalan Shekarabi (Social Democrat) born in Manchester to Iranian parents (Minister for Public Administration since 2014).

Many known writers and journalists in Sweden have immigrant roots. One example is Theodor Kallifatides, an immigrant from Greece during the 1960s, who learned a new language to eventually become an extremely well-known author. Another example is Peter Wolodarski, the son of a Polish refugee who fled to Sweden during the 1960s. He is editor in chief of Sweden's major national newspaper, DN (the Daily News). Many public servants, academicians and cultural personalities in various fields show the possibility to use the huge potential of their migrant origin.

Another person is best-selling author Hassan Khemiri. He has written a number of novels as well as plays. He has also participated in the public debate, underscoring the issue of racial profiling by the Swedish police when he publicly challenged the Minister of Justice in 2013 by e.g. publishing debate articles in Sweden as well as in the New York Times. Essentially he explained institutional racism to the Minister of Justice, as well as the rest of the government, pointing out that racism carries with it various types of negative effects such as racial profiling by the police or other types of racial discrimination, and that this occurs even in an environment that lacks an open racist ideology (Khemiri 2013a, 2013b). This type of debate demonstrates the difficulties for Swedish policymakers to adequately address the issue of racial discrimination; the focus is all too often on the issue of changing attitudes as opposed to changing behaviour.

A special mention can be made of the persons elected to the Swedish Academy, which annually selects the annual Nobel Prize winner in literature. In 2011 Professor in Nordic Languages Tomas Riad was chosen. He is born in Sweden, but his parents are Egyptian and Swedish. More recently Jila Mossaed, a Swedish and Persian language writer of Iranian origin, was elected as a member of the Swedish Academy.)

6.1.5 Immigrant/diaspora organizational presence and contribution

There are more than 4 000 immigrant associations in Sweden. This gives an idea about the extent of the presence of such organizations throughout the country but their particular role is not easy to define. At best their role over the years has presumably been comparatively marginal, having mainly cultural and consultative role in regards to their membership, often divided into various migrant or ethnic or religious groupings.

In Sweden, on the one hand, there are national minorities (Sami, Sweden Finnish, Tornedal Finnish, Roma and Jews) representing five recognized linguistic minorities in Sweden. On the other hand, there are other organizations whose main purpose at least initially was to promote activities meant to ensure language, culture and identity preservation and development. In later years, they have shifted in purpose to some extent to the promotion of integration. In this regard national and local public subsidies have been available over the years relating to activity and organization support, or support for minorities, religious communities, cultural support and special support for youth or women's organizations with ethnic or religious orientation. Their role has been defined by successive official documents in terms of being in line with and supporting the "integration-political aims". Most policymakers at least assert the important role of immigrant organisations, at the same time that some assert that that role depends on their limited independence as CSOs (SOU 2005:56).

A government inquiry into structural discrimination has posed the question of whether the public subsidies themselves have often led to the various organisations competing with each other for limited resources, thus leading to a situation where there is little cooperation or coordination between the varying organisations. Once split up into the various ethnic, cultural or religious interests, without cooperation it is hard to imagine such organisations having much influence. Another issue is the idea of advocacy by civil society organisations (CSOs). The organisations representing the more powerful interests in Sweden such as the unions or employer's associations, generally have clear strategies on advocacy, both in terms of proposing laws and working to enforce those laws once they are in place. CSOs representing less powerful interests, for example immigrant organisations, have generally limited their advocacy to asking policymakers to look at their problems and solve them, and ideally give their organisations increased support. This situation, where the organisations are almost entirely dependent on public funds does not particularly encourage the idea that an important role for CSOs is the insight and willingness to engage in a critical dialogue with policymakers. And although policymakers tend to emphasise the importance of CSOs and their independence, little is done in practice. Instead policymakers often end up setting the priorities of CSOs by specifying the purpose of the current funding. Immigrant CSOs seem particularly vulnerable in this situation. The inquiry thus concluded that if such organisations were to have an influence, empowerment was needed, and was something that should be demanded by the CSOs (SOU 2005:56).

6.2
Contributions towards places of origin

Research shows that there is more to the probable contribution of migrants to their countries of origin than just sending remittances – without in any way minimizing their sizeable contribution. Remittances also contribute in some ways, directly or indirectly, to other positive effects, such as transferring knowledge and contributing to democratization – and through that, to the development of migrant sending countries. According to the Migration Policy Institute - MPI (Newland 2013) consistent evidence gathered through multiple studies demonstrates the long-term positive relationship between migration and development. Gathering a research-based summary of knowledge, the MPI briefly examined 8 relevant aspects in this context, putting a reality check in-between assumptions and evidence-based facts. These were:

1. ***Demographic trends*** – where future economic output (including labour markets and welfare systems) becomes an equation between "demographic aging on a global scale" and migration patterns (p. 3);
2. ***Remittances*** – where "numerous household studies have shown that remittance-receiving households invest heavily in human capital", even though counteracting measures are needed to reduce dependencies (p. 4);
3. ***Diasporas*** – much more than remittances, "major source of foreign direct investments (FDI), market development (export/outsourcing), technology transfer, philanthropy, tourism, political development, and more intangible flows of knowledge, new attitudes, cultural influence", and clear FDI-immigration correlation (p. 5);
4. ***Circular migration*** – "most productive" when voluntary, "rather than the product of a contract labour regime that confers time-limited permission to remain in the country" – noting e.g. that "Policymakers in some countries, such as Sweden, have acted [..] to remove obstacles to circulation, increasing migrants' freedom of choice and their ability to participate in development activities in their countries of origin and ancestry"; (p.6-8);
5. ***Migrant recruitment*** – concluding that "most negative effects of recruitment practices stem from excessive fees that recruitment agencies or middlemen charge" generating avoidable negative effects (p. 8-9);
6. ***High-skilled labour emigration*** – where lack of data lead to concluding that: "No evidence supports the assertion that emigration of health-care personnel from sub-Saharan Africa damages the development of Africa", and moreover, existent literature "spur rethinking about the brain-drain" also citing "at least 4 reasons" "to believe that the emigration of skilled people "does less damage than usually imagined, and may even be beneficial…" (p.10-11);
7. ***Development and protection of migrants' rights*** – where the study wants to dissociate observance of human rights from the extent migrants "contribute to economic development", but rather acknowledge that "evidence [shows that] migrants who enjoy a broad spectrum of civic, political, social and economic rights" are "better equipped to contribute to development than migrants who do not", while "the contrast in access to rights is most stark between migrants with legal status and those who lack authorization to live and work in the countries of destination", which is illustrated with several examples (p. 10-12)
8. ***Impact of climate-induced migration and development*** – Susan Martin notes that a "lack of alternative livelihoods" renders migration "the best or only option" for "regions experiencing change" (negative or positive), and a proper analysis of climate change impact requires the consideration of a multitude of factors (p. 11-12).

6.2.1 Social and economic remittances

According to available data, remittances are not only sent *from* Sweden, but also *to* Sweden to a comparable extent. Moreover, during 2013-2015, larger sums were actually received in Sweden than outflows from Sweden to other countries (see Table 8). This can be perceived as a paradox, but is also indicative of the extent of emigration from Sweden, something that needs greater examination.

Date	Remittance balance (M.$)	Remittance received (% GDP)	Remittance received (M.$)	Remittance sent (% GDP)	Remittance sent (M.$)
2017	-864.6	0.52%	2,819.4	0.68%	3,684.0
2016	-657.6	0.55%	2,854.5	0.68%	3,512.2
2015	-132.7	0.66%	3,268.7	0.68%	3,401.4
2014	532.6	0.73%	4,218.9	0.64%	3,686.3
2013	435.2	0.68%	3,960.0	0.61%	3,524.7
2012	-2,478.9	0.13%	721.9	0.59%	3,200.7
2011	-2,485.0	0.14%	776.1	0.58%	3,261.0
2010	-2,321.1	0.14%	687.8	0.62%	3,008.9

TABLE 8: SWEDEN – MIGRANT REMITTANCES

While it is possible that the extent of remittances is substantially larger than indicated, the figures in table 8 are by themselves highly significant for many of the recipient countries. There are substantially varying figures about how large the overall remittances could be – from Sweden Statistics estimate of SEK 3-4 billion to the World Bank estimate of SEK 32 billion. According to some reports the government has no idea about how much is sent home to relatives (OmVärlden, 2015-12-02). Sweden's most important paper DN reported in 2014 that immigrants sent over SEK 17 billion to their home countries. The article pointed out that this figure is equivalent to 50 per cent of Sweden's budget for development aid (DN. 2014-05-13). Whatever the exact figures are, it should be apparent the remittances play an important role in the economies of the countries that are net recipients.

It is clear that the figures relating to remittances from Sweden to e.g. Lebanon (251.3M.$) Thailand (250.8M.$), Nigeria (92.7M.$), Iraq (61.3M.$), Iran (56.7M.$) and Pakistan (40.9M.$)[1] provide important sources of economic survival as well as stimulus in those countries. A 2015 study (DELMI 2015:1) in Sweden concluded that remittances to Ethiopia play a significant economic role. At the same time the study recommended that Swedish policymakers make it easier to send remittances and improve the possibilities for making investments in Ethiopia.

6.2.2 Socio-economic investments in productive and service enterprises

Immigrant investments in their countries of origin are substantial as indicated in the previous section. The Swedish government has recognised the value of the various ways in which migrants can bring benefits to their countries of origin. Part of this has to do with the funds, the remittances that are sent to a person's home country to family and friends. These funds can contribute to development, not just for the recipient but also the society as a whole by stimulating consumption or for example investments in education. Remittances can also take the form of a transfer of values, ideas and contact networks. These can be termed social remittances concerning values related to fundamental rights or transfers of knowledge and promotion of trade flows and investments. Transfers of knowledge and values take place both in the country of origin and in the country of destination. (Sweden's Committee 2010).

6.2.3. Involvement in home community and countries of origin: democratization, sustainable development, etc.

The studies in this field seem limited. Nevertheless in examining the immigration to Sweden and emigration from Sweden it is apparent that many of those leaving Sweden have an immigrant background. Presumably quite a number of those leaving Sweden are returning to their home countries.

Lisa Pelling carried out case study of remittances from Sweden concerning transnational ties. Her focus was on remittances by Kurds living in Sweden, with a particular focus on northern Iraq, an area from which many had fled to Sweden as refugees. She shows various examples of how the remittances are not just a question of providing funds to family members or friends, but also involve specific investments. For example, in the 1990s Kurds in Uppsala collected funds that provided support for building a health centre in Halabja. Today it is called the Uppsala Clinic. Another example is the Kurdish Human Rights Committee that has a focus on establishing human rights in Iraq. In addition, some Kurds have been returning to the area, investing in businesses or providing support to schools. This is not just in terms of funds but also know-how. She concluded with the idea that a better understanding needs to be developed concerning the role of remittances in development, as well as the need to reduce the transaction costs associated with remittances (Pelling 2010).

Swedish Somalis have been quite active in developments in Somalia. In a policy brief DELMI discusses their engagement in a variety of focus areas resulting in concrete activities. They can be seen in the table below.

Focus	Activities
Health	Build/renovate hospitals, clinics · Pay salaries · Send used equipment · Capacity-building and awareness
Education	Build/renovate schools · Pay salaries · Send used equipment · Capacity-building and awareness
Drought relief	Provision and transport of water · Donations to drought committees · Drill boreholes · Crisis mapping
Sustainable development	Environment protection · Job creation and skills training · Capacity-building and awareness
Gender equality	Capacity-building and initiatives on: Reproductive health and FGM · Women and girls' rights
Human rights and democracy	Capacity-building and initiatives on: Democracy and good governance · Civil society development · Peace and conflict resolution · Youth and minority rights

DELMI POLICY BRIEF 2018:1. SOMALI DIASPORA GROUPS IN SWEDEN ENGAGEMENT IN DEVELOPMENT AND RELIEF WORK IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. P. 2.

1) See 2016 Sweden: Remittances sent by country of destination (2017) https://countryeconomy.com/demography/migration/remittance/sweden.

According to DELMI "Somali-Swedish diaspora engagement is characterized by diversity and flexibility, reflecting a strong civil society engagement in the Somali region. It is important to note that contributions to development projects do not replace individual remittances or donations for drought relief. This testifies the scope and flexibility of involvement of some diaspora actors who are active at three levels: as entrepreneurs who organize projects, as capacity developers engaged in knowledge transfer, and as sources and conveyors of resources. The engagement reflects the underlying motivations for involvement: a sense of moral obligation and urgency, embedded in social and economic support networks and Islamic charity practices. Professional and political ambitions may also play a motivating role." (DELMI 2018:1, p. 2-3).

6.2.4. Returnees as well as migrant/diaspora organizational presence and contribution

Åkesson & Eriksson Baaz note in their extensive study on African migrant returnees, the great expectations iterated by a multitude of actors within the contemporary policy discourse (governments, international agencies, NGOs, etc.). African returnees are expected to be(come) 'agents of development', playing "an important role in the development of their "home countries". They are expected to bring back social, economic and cultural capital in various forms, more specifically: "economic capital, knowledge, skills, social connections, values and attitudes gained 'in a developed North'" (Åkesson 2015). Some origin countries, such as Senegal, Cape Verde and Ghana, encourage return migration – particularly concerning highly skilled returnees (Åkesson 2015, p. 1; see also Berriane & De Haas 2012; Flahaux 2017).

However, authors also notice that, while a number of studies have reviewed expectations, the motivation of returnees and prerequisites of (choosing to) return as well as an analysis of the actual outcomes of return have received much less attention. This limits our knowledge – and potential understanding – of the mechanisms determining attempts and chances of success in such an endeavour. Authors devote consequently attention to "structural conditions in the countries of origin" and "the interplay between the capital acquired by migrants and the political, social and economic circumstances" in the societies they return to (Åkesson 2025. p 11). Flahaux (2017) noted just how important is the role of preparedness for the post-return reintegration process – contextualizing the issue of third country migrants' return, as a designated EU priority since 2000.

In a knowledge review concerning political remittances to countries of origin, Lundgren and Lundgren concluded that greater attention needs to be paid to political remittances. Among other things they found that the existing research shows that transfers of norms can contribute to political developments in a more democratic direction and toward a consolidation of democracy in developing countries. However, concerning transfers between countries even negative impulses can be seen such as radicalisation or the development of extreme political positions. For example, financial remittances can contribute to processes focused on peace, but they can also be used to counteract such processes, and even contribute to increased conflict. Their general conclusion concerning the political effects of the actions of migrants and diaspora groups is highly dependent on the context (DELMI 2015:2, p iv, viii-ix).

Concerning Kurds and Somalis in Sweden, see 6.2.3. above.

- CHAPTER 7 -

OBSTACLES
THAT IMPEDE MIGRANTS FULL CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT

7.1
Country of residence/destination/transit

7.1.1. Perceptions of Sweden – country of opportunities and challenge

Prior to arrival in Sweden, many migrants, just as foreigner in general, presumably have a very positive picture of Sweden as a champion of human rights and equality. This is a picture developed by both Swedes and non-Swedes. Yet much of this picture has to do with Sweden's foreign policy stances concerning e.g. Vietnam, Chile and South Africa and a reputation for generous foreign aid. At the same time there has been a growing understanding of the disconnect between foreign policy and domestic policy. This can be seen in Sweden losing various cases in the European Court of Human Rights as well as in Sweden's comparatively slow development of equality law, particularly concerning race and ethnicity. To a large extent there has been an idea that since Sweden is progressive internationally concerning racism, discrimination, ethnic oppression, Sweden cannot have those kinds of problems domestically. There has thus been a major struggle to even see the problem. When denial is the primary means of dealing with the issue of ethnic discrimination, it becomes even harder to give the idea of integration a clear meaning (SOU 2005:56).

One problem with an integration strategy that solely focuses on the labour market is the idea of what the term "integration on the labour market" actually means. Filling labour shortages arguably has little to do with integration if it is simply assumed that integration occurs merely because an immigrant has a job. When the term integration was introduced in Sweden during the 1990s and for many years forward, there was an idea that the key to integration was equal rights, opportunities and duties – regardless of ethnic background. Integration was a mutual process involving "immigrants" and "Swedes, involving language and other skills and counteracting of racism and discrimination. Today, the term has been reduced to the idea that integration is achieved when "immigrants" have a job, any job, regardless of their qualifications. The idea that immigrants will take a job and accept a job that is not relevant to their qualifications has more to do with an individual survival strategy rather being relevant to the idea of integration. In fact, describing a situation where highly qualified persons feel forced to accept jobs without relevance to their individual qualifications can actually be counterproductive, in terms of the negative message sent to others. It can instead detract from an individual's belief in their future in Sweden. Filling occupations where there are shortages is a necessity, but this is a necessity regardless of whether there are immigrants available for those tasks. The fact that many of Sweden's doctors today have a foreign background is not an indication of integration but rather an indication that Sweden had a desperate shortage of doctors and was willing to fill that shortage even with foreign doctors. (See e.g. SOU 2005:56).

7.1.2 Major obstacles – contextual vulnerabilities

There is a general agreement in literature (public investigations, academic) and stakeholders' interviews, that the main obstacles impeding migrants' full contribution to development are related to *housing*, *employment* - including instances of *discriminatory treatment* in the labour market, *education*, *health,* as well as *family-related* issues and *vulnerabilities*, not in the least related to the societal climate and impact of attitudes as facilitating social integration or not. There is a mutual dependency relationship between availability of housing and availability of working opportunities, as both are *sine qua non* conditions of subsistence.

At the same time, what is missing is a serious focus on structural discrimination, which underlines the interconnection between discrimination and employment, housing, education, the legal system, health care, social services and the media. In the Blue and Yellow Glass House: Structural Discrimination in Sweden (SOU 2005:56), after examining the research on discrimination in these fields, the inquiry concluded that denial of the problem was a key issue that would undermine other positive efforts to help,

understand, educate or control immigrants, particularly those who could be considered to be visible minorities. Up to the 1960s Finns were not considered favourably in Sweden, but this started changing as "other" groups started arriving.

One issue taken up concerning denial was the lack of research that made it clear that Sweden had a problem with discrimination, whether in employment, housing or access to goods and services. Although various types of research had been carried out in Sweden concerning e.g. Swedes and non-Swedes. They were generally of two types: interviews with different groups about their perceptions of discrimination or statistical analyses of e.g. unemployment statistics. Sweden had few persons who were openly racist – particularly in positions of power. Explaining to politicians that concerning integration, persons in positions of power, were a part of the problem. This is difficult because then you might have to put measures in place that restrain the actions of the social partners. This was also difficult in that instead of focusing on unions or employers, it was easier to explain away the research. Victims of perceived discrimination may have a perception of discrimination, but there could be many other explanatory factors. The same idea applied to disparities concerning differences in employment figures, there could be many other explanatory factors. For some reason economists had a great influence in the field of migration/integration, and they pretty much supported policymakers in denial of the problem.

In addition, for many years, Sweden in practice had had a ban on the use of situation testing concerning discrimination. This is a method where the ethnic factor is isolated, using CVs with the name of a Swede and a Middle Eastern name. Once a different treatment is shown, it is hard to deny what happened, regardless of the good or bad attitudes of the perpetrator. This began to change around 2004 when the Swedish Integration Authority (Integrationsverket) started working with the ILO to develop some testing in Sweden (Integrationsverket 2004).

Once there was this official "approval", even economists became involved, developing much of the situation testing research in the past 10 years. This has led even economists, carrying out a survey of the research in the field to conclude that the research shows that"One can no longer deny that the occurrence of ethnic discrimination contributes to the ethnic gap in employment" (Skedinger and Carlsson 2011).

Situation testing has been used to demonstrate discrimination in housing, nightlife and most recently some researchers concluded that discrimination seemed to occur in public services. Even if the research is somewhat clearer today on the issue of discrimination, the issue is clearly not at the top of the agenda of policymakers today. In part this has to do with the overwhelmingly positive view of asylum policy that generally existed from 2007 until the crisis of 2015 and in part with the relatively disempowered role of immigrant organisations.

Discrimination, whether at the individual level or the structural level, is not the only problem concerning immigrants in Sweden. It is important with learning the language, learning other skills that are relevant, developing an effective system for examining and validating the qualifications, experiences and skills of migrants. The problem is if, in spite of developing those skills, the individual is nevertheless discriminated against and forced to accept a life where they are not fully respected as individuals. This is why the Glass House inquiry presented the need for a focus on equal rights and opportunities/anti-discrimination by policymakers. The message that policymakers will struggle to ensure that a migrants has a fair chance on e.g. the job market, will hopefully lead to 1/ serious measures that actually counteract discrimination and 2/ inspire migrants to believe in their future and their children's future, thus encouraging them to struggle that much harder to gain the skills that are needed and to overcome the obstacles that come their way (SOU 2005:56).

7.1.2.1 Lack of protection of, respect for and/or enforcement of human and labour rights

a. Human rights: the gap between law and practice

Sweden has ratified all of the relevant international conventions that relate to non-discrimination and human rights. This includes the UN conventions such as ICERD, ILO's core conventions including no. 111 discrimination in employment and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Except for the ECHR, which has been adopted through a Swedish law, the others have not been particularly influential on Swedish law. The EU anti-discrimination directives however have had a clear influence at least on the formal tools that are included in the Discrimination Act (2008:567).

In 2009 a fairly comprehensive Discrimination Act (2008:567) went into effect. In 2008 there were four single ground laws prohibiting discrimination in working life concerning sex, ethnicity and religion, disability and sexual orientation. They included a hierarchy of protection particularly regarding sex discrimination in that positive treatment was allowed and proactive measures were required. In addition there were three multi-ground civil laws prohibiting discrimination in the fields of higher education, schools and other areas of social life. The 2009 Act essentially merged these seven civil laws, including their hierarchy of protection, and added the grounds of age and transgender identity or expression. However, while the law essentially fulfils the formal requirements of the EU anti-discrimination directives, the law is not necessarily effective in terms of remedies and enforcement.

Particularly concerning ethnicity and religion, the development of case law that might be effective in changing norms has been very limited. At least part of the problem is the practical monopoly on enforcement by the Equality Ombudsman (DO) and the unions. This is a result of the lose pays principle in Sweden. If the Ombudsman or a union takes on a case on behalf of a complainant, it is as the named party, which also means that they take on the cost risk of losing. This can also apply to NGOs, but civil society in Sweden (other than the unions) has no developed tradition of using civil law cases as a form of advocacy. Although it cannot be said that there are any full-fledged public interest law firms working on e.g. enforcement of equality law, there are indications that civil society is starting to move in this direction. This is a trend that needs to be encouraged (Lappalainen 2018).

Despite having a highly developed legal system that formally acknowledges Sweden's observance of human rights and commitment to equal treatment and anti-discriminatory practices, the Amnesty International Report 2017/18 provides a different picture of Sweden. According to Amnesty "authorities failed to adopt effective strategies to prevent racist and xenophobic attacks" (Amnesty 2017/2018, p. 347-348). Furthermore, while the emergency temporary measures introduced in 2016 reduce the right to protection only to refugees fulfilling the demands of the Geneva Convention, excluding in practice humanitarian grounds for protection, the report also noted that its provisions preclude the right to family reunification for asylum-seekers granted subsidiary protection. Even the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights issued a recommendation that Sweden lift the measures. The Amnesty Report also takes up issues of discrimination, noting for instance: "Roma citizens from Romania and Bulgaria supporting themselves through begging continued to be subjected to harassment and denial of basic services including shelter, water and sanitation, education and subsidized health care" (Amnesty 2017/2018, p. 347-348).

A 2018 report to the EU noted several major problems related to access to justice concerning in particular, but not only, ethnic discrimination. The DO has been increasingly limiting the cases it takes to court, asserting a focus on strategic litigation. At the same time, the DO has adopted a policy of issuing non-binding, non-appealable decisions. This increases the number of "handled" cases, but without the risk of losing. The unions also seem reluctant to take cases to the Labour Court. They only represent their members and focus on negotiations. In 2018, the DO filed a total of four cases with the courts, which regardless of the strategy is odd given that the DO has a budget of about 120 million annually and 105 employees. The report points out that this indicates a developing problem, since the Discrimination Act requires case law if it is going to actually lead to changes in norms so that people do not get subjected to discrimination in the first place. In addition there is the issue of a lack of access to justice for victims. They can take cases to court on their own but this means running substantial cost risks if they lose, and only minor compensation awards if they win. This means that most will refrain, even if they have a good case (Lappalainen 2018).

There are other issues as well that seem more to be political to placate the extreme right wing. One example is the old but often repeated focus on language competence. Thus the new government's agreement to introduce language testing as a formal requirement for citizenship. Language skills are a necessity in many situations, but including them as part of a citizenship test seems to be more of a signal to others in Sweden, underlining the idea that "we" are putting pressure on "them". Otherwise the new government might have been more concerned about ensuring that people with adequate language skills are not rejected by the labour market or in other situations due to exaggerated references concerning language skills.

b. Labour market participation and discriminatory treatment - between theory and practice

> *"That many of Sweden's immigrants came for humanitarian reasons, from origin countries where the education systems and labour markets are quite different from those prevalent in Sweden, can only partially explain the disparities in labour market outcomes between immigrants and the native-born."* (OECD 2014 p.5)

Labour force participation is considered by far the most important element of integration and full participation in relation to mutual development. The Swedish labour market has changed over the years. During the open post-WW2 labour market, immigrants were coveted and even directly recruited from their countries of origin (Italy, Greece, Turkey, Finland and former Yugoslavia). Their work played a pivotal role in the development of the welfare state.

Restrictions on labour migrants took effect in the 1970s and 1980s, shifting migration to refugees and family reunification. This was followed by the unprecedented crisis of the 1990s, when even well-educated Swedes for the first time faced unemployment. Finally, there are the variations of the 2000s, partly relating to unemployment, partly relating to (selective) shortages of labour with proper qualifications, as well as estimated shortages due to retirement.

The above-cited 2014 OECD study noted the multi-level discrepancies between employment levels of migrants and native-born, whether referring to low-qualified counterparts (where migrants lag 25% lower), women – with a better ratio, but still room for improvement" - and youth (OECD

2014 p 5). Seven thematic areas were considered problematic as well as relevant: 1/ Basic skills and Swedish language for adults, 2/ Validation and recognition, 3/ Employer demand, 4/ Discrimination, 5/ Networks and job search, 6/ School-to-work transitions, and 7/ Co-ordination among actors.

Differences in employment rates between native- and foreign-born decrease proportionally with the duration of residence, though not totally. This can be seen in Graph 5 below. The four bars represent differing times of residence. The largest employment gap affects people born in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, particularly those with a shorter time of residence. Those with employment rates closest to those born in Sweden are people born in the other Nordic countries, closely followed by people from the other EU15 countries. In general men have a higher employment rate compared to women, but according to Graph 5 women from the Nordic countries and from Africa with a longer period of residence seem to be an exception to this gender pattern. "The pattern remains using statistical methods comparing persons with the same age, education and marital status." (Attström. 2007:10-11).

There are also differences according to occupation. There used to be an over-representation of foreign-born in manufacturing during the 1980's, but that changed by 2004 with higher employment rates of foreign-born in hotel & restaurant, health care and "other private services".



GRAPH 5: EMPLOYMENT RATES, FOREIGN BORN, ACCORDING TO REGION OF BIRTH & DURATION OF RESIDENCE, 16-64 YEARS OLD, 2003
Source: STATIV, database at the Swedish Integration Board. In: Attström 2007:10

A 2007 study focusing on call-back rates in job-seeking situations indicates a clear disadvantage for applicants with Arabic or African sounding names. However, it could not establish any rational choice behind the discriminatory treatment, but rather consistency with social distance – with little difference based on quality of applications or merits (Bursell 2007) (see Table 10 below).

	No call-back	Call-back for both	Call-back foreign name only	Call-back Swedish name only	Relative call-back rate	Net discrimination rate	Number of applications
Normally merited	60.7	15.8	4.3	19.2	1.8	37.9	1912
Extra merited	57.0	15.9	4.3	22.9	2.0	43.2	1630

Pearson chi2(3) = 7.7498 Pr = 0.049. Two-sample test of proportion for call-back Ho: 0.081

TABLE 10: CALL-BACK RATES BY APPLICATION QUALITY
Source: Bursell (2007:14)

Additional references concerning discrimination can be made to Carlsson & Rooth's 2006 discussion paper, showing discrimination in recruitment of men with an Arabic sounding name, Rydgren (2004), Aldén & Hammarstedt (2014), Lappalainen (2018).

As the above indicate, there are discrepancies between law and actual practice. The Swedish theoretical discourse has possibly been on a high level, but it seems to have had little contact with people's everyday realities, particularly for those directly concerned. However, one major issue is possibly the relationship between law and social change. The privileged position of the social partners in Sweden in relation to the Parliament may be a key here. The social partners are always in the room when laws affecting them are discussed, particularly laws against discrimination in working life. Over the years, although not able to stop the development of such laws, they have been able to affect them by limiting oversight, remedies and enforcement – usually as a joint interest. This is of particular interest since there is fairly universal agreement that an individual breaking into the labour market, is also a key to overcoming obstacles in other fields. At the same time, those who are discriminated against and their representatives are seldom near the room, and if they are there is usually a lack of clarity as to desirable outcomes.

	Women		Men	
Sector	Native born	Foreign born	Native born	Foreign born
Manufacturing	8.5	9.9	23.7	24.8
Construction	1.0	0.2	11.1	4.4
Trade	11.5	9.7	13.8	13.5
Hotel & restaurant	3.0	5.7	1.7	8.7
Bank & insurance	4.8	3.2	7.3	4.8
Other private service	8.6	11.8	9.0	11.7
Government, education, research	25.6	21.6	11.8	10.2
Health & care	27.8	30.9	4.6	7.6
Other	9.2	7.1	17.0	14.2
Total	100	100	100	100

TABLE 11: DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED ACROSS INDUSTRIAL SECTORS, FOREIGN- & NATIVE-BORN, 16-64 YEARS OLD, 2004 (IN %)

Source: Statistics Sweden, Labour Force Surveys, 4th quarter 2004 in Swedish Integration Board (2005). Figures in red indicate statistically significant differences between foreign-born and native-born (5% level). In: Attström 2007:11

A variety of reforms by various governments have been tried over the years in order to help migrants find their way in Sweden. Generally this also means a focus on increasing labour market participation, quite often with different variations of government job subsidies. The 2010 "Establishment reform" (*etableringsreformen*), a programme of introduction to the Swedish society and labour market, was meant to cover all of the basic needs of newcomers, from reception and dwelling to instruction in Swedish, including societal orientation, educational programmes for adults, school, childcare as well as social support (2016:2-3). Despite good intentions and theoretically good prerequisites for a fast integration into the society – with a goal of work and self-sustenance within 18 months. Some positive results were found in the evaluation, but the goals of the reform were hardly achieved (Joona et.al. 2016).

Instead of the 2010 reform, a new "establishment programme" (*etableringsprogrammet*), has been introduced which focuses on mainstreaming migrants more into the normal situation for the unemployed, thus removing the rigidity that applied earlier (Migrationsinfo 2019).

While a great deal is done for "migrants", there is too little focus on discrimination. Denial of discrimination is easier. An ongoing indication of discriminatory tendencies in Sweden is the use of situation testing as a tool to determine if ethnic or other discrimination was taking place. Denial of discrimination was the norm in society for many years. Eventually, after opposition by the government was overcome, researchers started using this method by, e.g. sending in similar job applications that were different in name only. One came from a person with a name like Mohamed Ali and the other from Sven Svensson. Researchers were able to confirm the problem through situation testing (see e.g. Magnus & Rooth 2006; ILO's situation testing & Attström 2007; Rorive 2009; Lappalainen 2018). This issue is also discussed above in 6.1.2. The testing showed discrimina-

tion against (equally qualified and educated) persons with migrant family names and/or visible ethnic markers. Candidates of 'migrant' heritage had to make 5 times as many applications in order to land a positive response in comparison with 'Swedes' without the ethnic markers. The discrimination occurred at all stages of the employment process and was considered to reflect aspects of structural and systemic discrimination as well as direct discrimination. This method has also been used to establish that Sweden also has a problem with housing discrimination.

A government inquiry, *Det blågula glashuset – strukturell diskriminering i Sverige* (SOU 2005:56) (The Blue and Yellow Glass House – Structural Discrimination in Sweden) encouraged the development of situation testing as a method concerning research, enforcement and as a quality control method concerning the equality policies of government agencies. The inquiry also noted the need for greater efforts to counteract discrimination by policymakers not just through the law but also as employers, as service providers, as public contractors and as lawmakers. In other words moving some of the focus from discriminated groups (how do we help them, educate them and control them) to those with the power to discriminate (employers, unions, civil servants, etc.). One example was the introduction of anti-discrimination clauses in public contracts. Although watered down, the government did adopt the Regulation (2006:260) on anti-discrimination conditions in procurement contracts. Sweden's largest government agencies are to include such conditions in their larger public contracts. However, there are serious questions about the regulation's effectiveness (Lappalainen 2018).

c. Treatment at work: decent working conditions, occupational safety and health; labour inspection, forced labour conditions

Research indicates that unemployment rates in some respects seem to be proportional to the degree of perceived "otherness" or difference. For instance, even among Europeans, though comparable, the proportion of non-Nordic unemployment is slightly higher than that of native-born. Among non-Europeans there is also a variation, though it seems that the proportions are as much influenced by the degree of proficiency in Swedish and time of residence. This may explain why South Americans, having long resided in Sweden, are more established than others, while Africans and Asians consistently show lower employment rates – even though the rates increase in relation to the length of residence (Aldén & Hammarsteadt, 2014). Fägerlind and Ekelöf (2001) analysed the variations in degree of employment across barriers like ethnicity, age and equality – but also what other aspects seem to play a role, for instance local social aspects, e.g. integration in the workplace, including understanding of the particularities of the social climate.

In Sweden, the Swedish Work Environment Authority (AMV - Arbetsmiljöverket) is in charge of an overall supervision of working conditions in Sweden, i.e. it has a mandate to ensure that laws on working environment and working hours are followed – in particular the Work Environment Act. This is done primarily by inspecting workplaces, promoting cooperation between employers and employees, enabling employment of persons with functional impairments through cooperation with other authorities, producing relevant statistics and disseminating pertinent information about applicable provisions in the field.

Other relevant aspects are e.g. observance of the working time norms according to Working Time Act (*Arbetstidslagen* - ATL), paid holidays, etc., including when shorter employment contracts are concerned or when working abroad. A recent report regarding foreign workers within the "green" fields of activity (agricultural, forestry) concludes that there are numerous problems, extensively related to communication issues, not in the least cultural misunderstandings. It is not only the purely linguistic difference, but work-related cultural differences, with misunderstandings that may even reflect conceptual differences in understanding the nature of the necessity to follow rules related to work safety, attitudes towards working environment demands, etc. (AMV 2018). AMV has reported, as have others, about the exploitation of low-paid migrants. This involves the risks that can be assumed in conditions creating unhealthy competition. They can be required or expected to assume risks related to violations of various rules, resulting in work-related injuries that go unreported or unrecognized. If informed, this can lead to the AMV calling for sanctions or other measures.

A recent study (2018) published by the County Administrative Board of Stockholm County (*Länsstyrelsen*), and produced by researchers at the Centre for Multidisciplinary Studies on Racism, CEMFOR, at Uppsala University, concluded that structural discrimination based on peoples' skin colour is a major problem. The study analyses several variables: unemployment, employment, average incomes, low- and high-status careers, including management positions in relationship to educational qualifications of Afro-Swedes as compared to the rest of the population (Wolgast et.al 2018).

The category of "Afro-Swedes" consists of two sub-categories which are compared to each other, the first including persons 20-64 years old, born in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the second category concerning persons of the same age-group born in Sweden, with at least one parent born in sub-Saharan Africa (which according to the authors also constitutes a limitation of the study, as it excludes black people living in Sweden born in other regions, or with a different constellation of parents (i.e. at least one parent born outside sub-Saharan Africa, or with both parents born in Sweden, etc.).

The "rest of the population" does not refer to "ethnic Swedes" or white majority Swedes but includes all persons with both parents born in Sweden as well as born in another country outside sub-Saharan Africa – which means that it includes e.g. persons with Muslim names, Roma persons, persons from the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) an Latin America – "i.e. categories of residents which previous research has shown are being discriminated against on the labour market" (Wolgast et.al 2018 p.8).

The authors conclude "the situation that Afro-Swedes are confronted with in the labour market is probably even worse than what the data shows" (Wolgast, et.al. p. 8). The study also accounts for social class (via educational attainment, income, employment in low-/high-status job positions, salary/income, time span spent in unemployment and various types of employment. A conclusion is that there is a clear connection between a person's income and skin colour, despite equivalent qualifications.

The study shows that "the Swedish labour market is characterized to a high degree by both a *horizontal segregation* – as Afro-Swedes tend to hold low-status /low-paying jobs, and *vertical segregation* – as it is more difficult for them to advance to higher job-positions/with higher status and salary, than for the rest of the population (Wolgast). Pay gaps on various levels on the labour market are confirmed, with differences between 10-36%, depending on the working sector. This is also reflected in disposable income, with the additional paradox that the disposable income gap increases with higher levels of educational attainment, with a difference between 7% for lower educated, to 39% for those with highest educational level (completed PhD), with some geographical differences. Levels of unemployment are also substantially higher than for other groups, while they are clearly under-represented in both high-status jobs and in management and leadership positions (however, even then with comparatively lower salaries), but over-represented in low-status jobs (even there with lower pay).

In this context, the authors' of the study on Afro-Swedes made several recommendations that are of interest, several of which are relevant to this report. They included:

- investigating possibilities to broaden the scope of the Discrimination Act "with respect to employers' mandatory responsibility to implement an action plan", including a widened categorization of discrimination grounds – i.e. national/ethnic origin, skin colour, etc.;
- suggested sanctions against employers contravening the Discrimination Act
- establish an agency responsible for "collating surveys and action plans that can be used against discrimination in the labour market and at the working place"
- measurable indicators that can be evaluated - and used as basis for further recommendations;
- financing further research to be used as basis for decision-making by government authorities and other leaders, by providing updated reliable, empirically verifiable knowledge-based reports on racism and discrimination on the labour market
- the research should also be able to answer questions like how and why the depicted phenomena occur, and
- investigate consequences of racism and discrimination on individuals "with respect to their social life, their physical and mental health, and their feelings of trust and social belonging" (Wolgast et.al. p.11).

This particular study has a unique span and clarity in design, methodology and outcome, which makes it particularly valuable both as a source of information, the results produced, its reliability, and designing a strategy that might lead to relevant results. Its recommendations are also an excellent example as tools for combatting negative societal phenomena of particular importance.

7.1.2.2 Lack of access to education or business opportunities

a. Formal opportunities

Education remains a cornerstone of integration (including identifying and recognizing human capital at an early stage and when relevant, validating qualifications – including facilitating eventual completion of studies, adapting previously obtained competence to the structure and demands of the Swedish Labour market, and when applicable, obtaining necessary licenses when demanded as in the case of the medical professions or qualification as a teacher.

Legal residents in Sweden formally have equal access to education and/or business opportunities. A permanent residence permit normally opens up the same opportunities as for citizens. When it comes to access to education, even EU-citizens enjoy comparable access to that of local citizens – while third country citizens have to pay a fee to access, for instance, higher education. Children have a right to education, free of charge, including special training in Swedish and in their mother tongue. Even asylum-seeking children have full formal access to the Swedish school system. Even when irregular, as long as they are under 18 at the time of arrival, they have the same right (FARR 2018).

b. From formal opportunities to formal and informal hindrances or barriers

The temporary law adopted in 2016 limited access to upper secondary schools, however later amendments in 2017 opened possibilities to complete on-going studies. Two recent judicial decisions allow application of the so-called

high-school law (*gymnasielagen*); after lower court decisions challenging their constitutionality.[1] The law allows unaccompanied minors to stay and complete their upper secondary studies.

Adults have a right to free education in Swedish and their integration programme involves courses in specialized Swedish for professionals.

However, informally and in practice, barriers may occur at various levels. An OECD study (2014) reviewing Sweden's migrant integration system, identified seven areas to be reviewed with several directly related to education. Among these challenges, acquiring *basic skills* and *Swedish language (proficiency) for adults* – indicating among others that "literacy levels of foreign-born with a low level of education lag 60 points behind their native counterparts; equivalent to approximately 8 years of schooling" (OECD 2014 p. 6-7). Also, despite free access to language training, the quality of the training and thus the results vary – sometimes not even enabling low-skilled persons to read and write. Too often, interventions are offered in project-form – while mainstreaming would confer a better chance of success, also through continuity. (OECD 2014 p. 21). Segregation in housing also contributes to limited interaction with the majority society consequently also limiting the development of language skills (OECD 2014 .p.8). Segregation in housing as well as in education raises concerns both with regard to performance and the capacity to enter into the educational mainstream. When migrant students get stuck in the system for too long, this also means missing opportunities to reach their full potential before officially reaching adulthood.

Available data from the OECD survey of skills indicate considerable disparities between foreign- and native-born individuals, among the largest in the OECD (OECD 2016 p.98). At the lowest end of educational skills, achieving literacy is one of the targeted minimum standards to achieve. This in itself is a special challenge.

At the opposite end, referring to Liebig and Huddleston (2014), the OECD study points out that "high quality vocational education and apprenticeships have been found to be effective in building skills demanded by the labour market" (OECD 2016 p.102). This is in line with some of the potentially most successful pathways of integration on the labour market, often combining gaining language skills with real on-the-job experience in actual workplaces. Combining studies with work experience for young adults (OECD 2016 p 103) is likely to have an enabling effect concerning language skills and thus competitiveness both in the field of education and on the labour market.

Validation and recognition of the higher educations of migrants with are formally in place, but without necessarily overcoming the intended obstacles. Further, complementary education - to the extent it is available at all - is still underdeveloped (OECD 2016 p.9). The same study noted that there are disparities in actual educational outcomes with regard to migrant children – who more often attend a socio-economically disadvantaged school, 23% in Sweden compared to 15% on the OECD average. Even among those successful enough to enter upper secondary school, "10.5% of foreign-born students drop-out (…) compared to 5.4% of native-born" (OECD 2016 p.17). These factors also lead to a disadvantaged position as job-seekers.

c. Ethnic business opportunities – a tale of success and hinders

Migrant entrepreneurs cover a wide range of activities and seem to be even more motivated than local entrepreneurs. At the same time, as noted above, the motivation is more based on economic survival or lack of choice as compared to Swedish born business owners where opportunity seems to be the motivating force. Several studies analyse conditions under which (small) businesses run by persons with an immigrant background thrive – or not. Among these, a study done by the Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (*Tillväxtverket* - government agency under the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation), about diversity in business (2014) noted that most small businesses owners are men and have a Swedish background. However the study shows that there are a number of women and young people with an immigrant background "with a stronger will to grow than others" (Tillväxtverket 2014).

The same Agency mentions the increase in numbers of so-called working-integrating social companies, from 174 in 2009 to 350 in 2016, while the number of persons working in these companies doubled from about 3000 to about 6000. The statistics indicate that there are about 20% more women working in these companies – and in particular, that the group with a migrant background – men and women, is the one that is increasing the most. Describing the activity, a representative of one of these social companies mentions that mostly women with immigrant background who have not worked before and may not have such a good command of Swedish seek work at these companies. At the same time she rejects the pre-conceived idea that these job-seekers are necessarily low-educated, pointing out that about 485 of those employed have a secondary (high-school) education, and about a third even a post-secondary education.

1) Migration Court of Appeal case number UM12342-18 issued on 2019-05-09. Accessed 2019-05-15
http://www.kammarrattenistockholm.domstol.se/Domstolar/kammarrattenistockholm/Domar/2019%20jan-juni/Referat%20i%20mål%20UM12342-18.pdf.

Returning to self-employed persons having started businesses themselves, a main obstacle for them is the difficulty in obtaining financing to start and run a business. This group of persons are comparatively often denied loans and credit than other groups. In general, many immigrants have difficulties in obtaining loans for whatever reason, e.g. to buy an apartment, start a business, or get credit for other reasons. This contributes to various degrees of marginalization not only in working life, but also in everyday life, due to various limitations of choices and opportunities. There are even indications that there may be a proportionality between the degree or extent of a negative response, discriminatory or marginalizing treatment, and the extent of perceived otherness. Instead of discussing the issue too much, the public sector (whether local governments or state agencies could clarify that the public has a right to expect that the public sector will refrain from enriching e.g. banks that discriminate and adopt a policy stating that the public sector will move their business elsewhere if it shown that banks are carrying out discriminatory policies.

7.1.3 Immigrants in the Swedish Housing Market

One of the most important practicalities related to transnational migration is housing. What is most often referred to as "labour market integration" has an interdependency aspect related to availability of both. There is an uneven distribution of housing in Sweden. In places where housing is available, jobs are often lacking. And the opposite is true as well. Jobs can generally most easily be found in urban areas where there is a shortage of housing. In these same urban areas, Sweden has a high degree of segregation combined with a lack of affordable housing.

A clear phenomenon of *segregation in housing* has developed over the years, with ethnic agglomerations in certain suburbs. The pattern is however different from that in other countries as it is not necessarily along ethnic lines as such, but rather as a form of socioeconomic divide. These areas can be called immigrant dense. They are some of Sweden's most multi-ethnic areas except for the detail that fewer and fewer Swedish born persons remain in those areas. Approximately 200 languages are spoken in Sweden, often with a large number of languages spoken in the immigrant-dense areas.

The character of segregation varies depending on the varying ethnic communities. Some groups choose to share a common space because it provides them with a feeling of safety, through cultural and religious commonality. There are also drawbacks to that. The more segregated an area, the higher the probability that acquisition of the local language may be delayed – or even impaired, especially if the motivation to acquire it is low. The acquisition could be even more delayed if there is a low initial level of education, which may be a major hinder in itself, sometimes worsened in regard to the degree of perceived otherness by the individual as well as others. This may lead to a certain sociocultural isolation making it difficult for some (groups of) migrants to identify with and feel at home in their new country.

The expected *availability* or *scarcity of jobs* at the local level is likely to play a determinant role in the decision to stay or go. For migrants, there is also the additional aspect of limited decision-making power in relation to authorities and gate-keepers that may supersede a person's own choice. Börjeson (2018), in his study about diversity and segregation in housing in Sweden discusses the social phenomenon of segregation as cause and effect, also seen through the public discourse and assumptions. In some ways, checking assumptions causally linking segregation and unemployment or criminality rates resemble one of the oldest puzzles: which came first, the egg or the hen?



GRAPH 6: DIVERSITY, SEGREGATION AND OWNERSHIP FORMS IN LARGE CITIES IN SWEDEN, 2016/2017
Source: Börjesson: Diversity and segregation in Sweden/Mångfald och segregation i Sverige (2018:28)

Considering results of other studies, Börjeson concludes that e.g. "both segregation and the unemployment gap are symptoms of other concurring causes, among others low education among [some] foreign-born and difficulties for foreign-born to find housing in more attractive areas" (Börjesson 2018, p.3).

After a detailed analysis of patterns of segregation while considering income and housing ownership variations (rentals, condos, small houses/villas – where villa areas show the lowest diversity levels), the author concludes that, in fact, year by year since 2012, segregation decreased at the same rate as the increase of ethnic diversity – especially in suburbs of large cities. According to his results, however, that does not signify a lower presence of ethnic Swedes, but rather a higher degree of diversity e.g. as a mix of people with origins in a large number of countries (Börjeson, p.37).

According to Andersson (1998 p.17-18), persons born in Sweden, with better jobs and economy, are more likely to move to better status areas. At the other end, persons from Africa and Asia are less prone to move – and if they do, they move more often among different parts of the "million-programme" areas. Age and family structure are other relevant elements influencing individuals' or individual households' propensity to move, with higher mobility tendencies among the young. There is also a connection to ethnic clusters: if a certain nationality is overrepresented in an area, the opposite applies: there will be a lower propensity to move within the group, which is likely to increase its economic strength due to networking's positive economic effects on the group.

The expected "trickle-down" effect that right-wing parties said they expected as a result of prioritizing high-cost housing and market prices, while successively limiting affordable public housing, did not occur. Housing, in particular the existence of affordable housing remains an infected issue in the public debate, especially in the most densely populated urban areas – primarily Sweden's largest cities and other immigrant-dense areas. In spite of the intense debate, neither side seems to have much in the way of solutions.

7.1.4 Lack of safe and legal pathways

Sweden's present legislation ensures access to legal pathways for labour migration – in a variety of forms, with full rights of family reunification under given conditions, and at the same time, a substantial number of resettlement quotas for refugees. However, in practice, there are currently few other legal pathways to enter the country to seek asylum. The result of lack of ways to enter legally to seek asylum means that

the poorest refugees are more disproportionally affected by the system. Their lack of means does not even allow them to try. Instead, they risk ending up as victims of human trafficking, slavery or organ trading. The patchwork of laws and regulations that have developed over the years means that a broad overview of the entire field is needed. The temporary act will be extended. Small details may be reformed. But for too long the whole area has been adjusted back and forth in a way that implementation by decision makers becomes highly difficult. On top of this, another problem is the legislative technique that can be seen in law that in theory requires local governments to share responsibility for reception of asylum-seekers. It has turned out that there is no means of enforcement included in the law in regards to cases where a local government decides that they do not want to abide by the law.

7.1.5 Lack of access to or exclusion from refugee system and protection

Sweden used to be one of the countries known for its relative generosity, having received the largest numbers of refugees in proportion to its population. After the peak year 2015 when new-arrivals reached over 163 000 within a relatively short period of time, putting a strain on the reception system and the country's reception resources, the new temporary legislation adopted in 2016 (2016:752) provides for a much more restrictive interpretation than the Aliens Act (2005:716).

There is, however, a lower limit in this otherwise extreme limitation. A refugee's temporary protection still stretches to 3 years and the subsidiary form of protection stretches to 1 year, and prolongation is possible.

The effects are evident: the number of persons applying for a residence permit after 2016 went substantially down, from the peak of 163 000 in 2015, to a mere 25 000 in 2017. However, the number of Convention and quota refugees went up during 2016-2017, according to a political agreement. Also, due to long processing times for the applications, the total number of residence permits granted went up during the same period of time, from 115 104 in 2015, to 151 032 in 2016 and 135 529 in 2017.

Even if there has been opposition to the temporary act, it should be clear even to its proponents that it has worked. At a minimum this should result in allowing the temporary act to lapse, rather than renewing as the new government has proposed.

7.1.6 Changing public opinion based on fear

A press release of the MPI published in June 2018 drew attention to the evolution of the radical right in Europe – exemplified among others by election results in Austria, Germany and France, etc., but also noticing that for the Nordic countries, it was not a new phenomenon. The situation in Sweden with the Sweden Democrats having established themselves in the political landscape since 2010 is pointed out as worrisome, noticing the link to immigration as a controversial issue and in some ways, as an excuse for the various parties to varying degrees to indicate their anti-immigrant stance through various signals. Some examples are the language test for citizenship, more calls for law and order in the suburbs, and anti-terror and security proposals. In this way they can reach to the hostile opinion that exists today and seems to be gaining strength. An article published in "The Local" in April 2018 stated that, according to recent opinion polls, 60% of voters want Sweden to take fewer refugees than it currently did – compared to 36% in an earlier poll from 2015.

The results of the recent elections in Sweden, consolidating the position of a party whose central political platform is reducing immigration, the SD (Sweden Democrats) mentioned before, confirms a worrisome trend within the Swedish political landscape. There is a sharper polarization with regard to attitudes towards immigration and immigrants, especially with regard to (potential) newcomers. Whereas this should still not be seen as a general shift of opinion, the increase in numbers of those supporting xenophobic ideas is a fact, and unfortunately, this also appears to have encouraged even more extremist manifestations, including far-right demonstrations by neo-Nazis such as the NRM (Nordic Resistance Movement) during recent years (2016-2018). These demonstrations are however most often met by counter-demonstrations – or even less expected lone protests "on impulse" such as that of Tess Asplund, who reportedly singlehandedly "defied 300 neo-Nazis at Swedish rally "in anger (Crouch 2016).

A recent study measuring perceptions concerning migrants in Sweden 2014-2016 concluded that, whereas the general opinion remains mostly positive, there is an increasing degree of polarization related to consumption of mass-media and perceived cultural distance, i.e. an increasingly negative opinion towards migrants originating from the Middle East and Africa (DELMI 2017:6).

7.1.7 Beyond facts and figures

The important remaining question is how Sweden can be put back on track in spite of the current negative factors at play. While migrants are extremely heterogeneous, they can be presumed to have at least one thing in common. They do not want themselves or their children to be subjected to discrimination. They want to believe in a Sweden where people are treated with respect for who they are and not irrelevant factors such as their ethnicity, skin colour, accent etc. So a key issue is if they can work together to change the agenda, to empower themselves.

The Blue and Yellow Glass House Inquiry (SOU 2005:56) had a number of practical suggestions concerning how the government can counteract discriminatory behaviour. Several key elements are fundamental to any measures promoting equality. One is the understanding that behaviour is the main problem rather than attitudes – those with the power to discriminate in Sweden generally already have good attitudes. Another is that laws and policies need to add some kind of cost risk to discriminatory behaviour. Focusing on equality and equal opportunities also lays a foundation for discriminated groups to cooperate with each other. These ideas guide the recommendations related to non-discrimination. They put equal rights, treatment and opportunities into focus. One idea is providing equal voting rights in local elections for "European" migrants (Norwegians, Icelanders, and EU citizens) who today have no waiting period as compared to all other migrants, essentially non-Europeans, who have to wait three years. Another is improved implementation of the Discrimination Act as well as the Swedish regulation requiring anti-discrimination clauses in the larger public contracts of Sweden's largest government agencies. These in turn need to be backed up by empowerment of civil society organisations.

7.2
Country of origin: certain obstacles

Increasing attention has been devoted lately to the importance of diasporic contributions to the development of countries of origin, as an important component of global developments and transnational interdependencies. Diasporic actors are in such contexts considered instrumental agents of change. Their knowledge and understanding of both systems enables them to understand and handle situations in a much more appropriate way than someone who is less familiar with both. Illustratively, here is just one recent example that is representative in this context.

A recent report shows the particular engagement of the Somali diaspora in Sweden as development actors in their country of origin. Their assistance "ranges from remittances to disaster relief and development projects, providing a lifeline in crisis and contributing to long-term processes of change" (DELMI 2018:1). This involves a wide range of activities such as ensuring water supplies, building schools and providing catastrophe relief. However, despite successes, some tensions and challenges occur.

The tensions can reflect anything from differences of opinion and different perceptions concerning priorities, health care as opposed to education, human rights as opposed to environmental protection. Dissatisfaction may also occur concerning the size of grants and/or higher expectations.

Administrative stress and constraints are indicative of conceptual differences in expectations and demands, for instance with regard to perceived difficulty in the application system (DELMI 2018:1.p.86), accepting standard grants (considered more or less sufficient for a given purpose).

Structural changes may require particular efforts, including cultural changes in approach, aspects on equality – especially fostering higher involvement and competence-increasing programmes and measures for women, time-aspects in "excessive waiting times for decisions and approvals" likely to "cause frustration among both Somali-Swedish associations and their partners" (DELMI 2018:1 p 72-73).

The report names "an uneasy working relationship" in the context of cooperation between local and diasporic actors – also as "insiders and outsiders" as well as "translators" of differing practices and perspectives (DELMI 2018:1.p.89). Trust, accountability and procedures may embed not only different ways to proceed, but also in-built cultural differences of approach. Connectivity, flexibility and networks may be or become instrumental in solving such issues.


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- CHAPTER 8 -

OPPORTUNITIES

FOR FACILITATING AND ENHANCING MIGRANTS' OWN DEVELOPMENT, CONTRIBUTIONS OF MIGRATION TO DEVELOPMENT, AND SHARED RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

8.1
Perceptions of Sweden – country of opportunities and challenge

The MIPEX-index is somehow indicative of the paradoxical success that ranks Sweden first out of 38 countries in migrant integration. To be clear it is important to note that MIPEX only asked if *policies* were in place, never making an assessment of if they were successful or effective. MIPEX pointed out that despite challenges, Sweden manages to have more ambitious and effective integration *policies*, which leads to high standards and even higher expectations – but also to frustration when limitations become apparent. What could have been pointed out in particular is the frustration that occurs when it is realized that at least some of the so-called "advanced" policies lack a connection to or have only a limited relation to reality. This is an area where the limited advocacy skills of migrant CSOs come into play. If laws or policies that lack substance, are nevertheless accepted by CSOs, it is somewhat unrealistic to expect policymakers to recognize the weakness of the policies they have adopted: especially if such recognition will require a confrontation with other more powerful interest such as the social partners.

Country of net migration since:	% Non-EU citizens	% Foreign-born	% Non-EU of foreign-born	% Non-EU university educated	% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country
< 1950s	3.9%	15.4%	66%	32%	68%
UN 2010 data in 2013	Eurostat 2013	Eurostat 2013	Eurostat 2013	Note: Adults aged 18-64, Eurostat 2013	Eurostat 2013

TABLE 15: KEY COMMON STATISTICS (USED AS BACKGROUND FOR THE MIPEX-INDEX STUDY)
Source: MIPEX-index Sweden 2015, http://www.mipex.eu/sweden

INDICATORS	VALUE	LEGEND
Overall score (with health)	78	
Labour market mobility	98	80-100 Favourable
Family reunion	78	60-79 Slightly favourable
Education	77	41-59 Halfway favourable
Health	62	21-40 Slightly unfavourable
Political participation	71	1-20 Unfavourable
Permanent residence	79	0 Critically unfavourable
Access to nationality	73	
Anti-discrimination	85	

TABLE 16: MIPEX-INDEX INDICATORS, SWEDEN, 2014 (PUBLISHED 2015)
Source: MIPEX-index Sweden 2015, http://www.mipex.eu/sweden

It has been noted in various cases that although Sweden for example has relatively modern laws against discrimination, at least in terms of the policies and tools that are in place, the actual practice is not easy to determine. However, it is possible to conclude that implementation is in various ways questionable. Having a good law on the books is easy. Actual implementation is much harder for a variety political, economic and cultural reasons. An important contributing factor is the relative weakness of civil society organisations and their almost total dependence on the government for subsidies. Nevertheless, there are indications that the CSOs are increasingly becoming interested not just in developing laws and policies, but also participating in their implementation rather than relying solely on the good intentions of policymakers (Lappalainen, 2018).

8.2 Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

A first comprehensive Report on "Sweden and the 2030 Agenda" was presented in 2017 to the UN High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, acknowledging Sweden's firm commitment towards its assumed obligations at the national and international levels and presenting some concrete, concise examples. Among others, producing national integrated indicators and planning measures targeting the implementation of the 17 global goals seen as a priority, together with the declared intention of promoting a wide engagement, instrumental in achieving the common goals, as well as a partnership engaging national, regional and local actors, with the intention of realizing the global goals "locally – throughout Sweden" (Swedish Government 2017 p.9).

According to the report, about 100 out of the approx. 120 indicators correspond totally or to an extent to the global indicators – and according to the assessment done by Statistics Sweden, the report claims that the country already fulfils 49, i.e. 20% of all the indicators. However, the report admits that there is a lot to do, even regarding the basics, such as issues related to poverty and vulnerability. The existence of "absolute poverty" is not acknowledged, but 15% of the population lives admittedly under the poverty threshold – defined as having a disposable income lower than 60% of the national median income (Swedish Government 2017 p.18). Sweden also declares its adherence to the ILO's recent Work Agenda. Goal 10 is explicitly dedicated to reducing inequality "within and among countries". The report states that "In recent years, migration policy and the refugee situation have been high on the agenda in Sweden and globally." (Swedish Government 2017. p.31). Considering the latest developments in Swedish migration policy, this claim seems at a minimum less than convincing.

Also, discrimination is acknowledged – however without any quantitative or qualitative assessment as such, but only a general note acknowledging various forms of discrimination in a legal meaning. The commitment to inclusive societies in Goal 16 mentions relevant issues pertaining to human rights, including observance of children's rights and the Child Convention. When considering e.g. the extent of expulsion of unaccompanied children – not mentioned at all in the text - it leaves a certain degree of uncertainty as to the actual extent of a concrete commitment beyond the formalities.

The rather brief description of the current programme to implement the 2030 Agenda in Ch.6 (Swedish Government 2017. p.40), especially as related to integration, provides once again a relatively accurate formal description of the issues. However, it becomes much less convincing when compared to concrete developments in recent years, which may well indicate awareness of the nature of the problem, but not necessarily an adequate response or an interest in responding to the challenges it poses. By comparison, stipulated partnerships and international cooperation and commitment to the Global Deal initiative appear to be much more convincing and encouraging.

After the elections in 2018, the new Swedish Government (still based on the Social Democrats and the Green Party) appears to be fully committed to Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030, with the ambition of assuming a leading role in putting it into practice. Sweden should develop into a "modern sustainable welfare state, at home and as a part of the global system".[1] To this end, according to local traditions, a Plan of Action was elaborated for 2018-2020 (*Handlingsplan Agenda 2030 för 2018-2020*),[2] describing a number of central measures for sustainable development expected to lead to certain effects during the coming years.

In the same context, the official goals for migration and asylum as part of that governmental commitment, are to "ensure a long-term sustainable migration policy, protecting the right to asylum and – within the framework of regulated immigration, enable trans-border movements, promoting a demand-driven labour-market immigration, observe the developmental effects of migration and deepen the European and international cooperation in the field".[3]

1) Government's global goals. https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/globala-malen-och-agenda-2030
2) See Handlingsplan Agenda 2030 2018–2020 https://www.regeringen.se/49e20a/contentassets/60a67ba0ec8a4f27b04cc4098fa6f9fa/handlingsplan-agenda-2030.pdf
3) Government statement. https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/migration-och-asyl/mal-for-migration-och-asyl/

In that context, the government expresses its determination to be "an important voice in Europe for observing the right to asylum and vulnerable groups" ensuring that "the EUs common asylum system should be effective, committed to the rule of law, sustainable in the long-run and humane" while taking "an increased shared responsibility for people in need of protection within the EU and a just, solidary distribution of asylum-seekers" as central part of this system.[4]

In this context, Swedish government representatives took part in the World Economic Forum in Davos 2016, and allotted 50 million SEK to the IOM specifically for attaining the Agenda 2030 goals. This sum brought the total Swedish contribution to about 370 million SEK – the equivalent of 44.2 million USD, making Sweden one of the largest donors among member states, prioritizing the work done within both the UN and the EU in the field of migration. Also, Minister Morgan Johansson expressed this commitment while visiting Dhaka, Bangladesh on 11 May 2016, in his speech entitled: "Emerging Global Migration and Mobility, Trends and Issues: A Swedish Perspective."[5]

As a general comment, of course some changes of direction are to be expected with the new government. The indications are that the temporary law will be revised in order to grant more family reunifications and residence permits for extreme vulnerable cases. However, the main traits of Sweden's EU and/or international commitments in the field can probably be expected to be maintained.

8.3 National policies, practices and responses that facilitate migrant contributions

There are no recent changes that facilitate migrant contributions.

8.4. Promising national/transnational practices on development by CSOs/diaspora organizations

Sweden has a long tradition of furthering social solidarity and commonality through a rich network and participation in numerous associations, characterized by commitment, engagement, solidarity and commonality. Wide social participation in some form(s) of organization, political, non-political, and educational or related to any kind of social engagement has been a characteristic of the Swedish society, and in its own way, the backbone of social cohesiveness and an important part of the Swedish model of social /societal solidarity.

Despite rather complex formal instruments developed to facilitate immigrant integration and the way the Swedish system is centred on the given roles of institutional actors programmatically in charge, there are aspects where the grassroots organizations' contribution can be extremely relevant, whatever their nature and focus. DELMI (Delegation for Migration Studies) has published reports showing some concrete examples of diasporic engagement in countries of origin, lately in Somalia and Ethiopia (see above). There are many grass root organizations, involved in aid and solidarity actions, often in cooperation with SIDA. The organizations are of a large diversity, and the social network they constitute play an important role in Swedish society.

4) Government statement. https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/migration-och-asyl/mal-for-migration-och-asyl/
5) The Activity in the EU during 2015. Skr.2015/16:115.

- CHAPTER 9 -

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 Conclusions

Migrants contribute to the economic, social and cultural development of Sweden. Migrant contributions are particularly visible in urban areas. This applies to a variety of areas such as working life, culture, journalism and education.

Sweden has distinguished itself by its efforts to develop appropriate migration and integration policies, through continuous efforts to find and adapt solutions to the complex and demanding tasks of transnational migration. As a destination for migration, Sweden acquired over the years an almost legendary reputation of being a country of compassionate humanitarian traditions, which led to the arrival of a relatively high number of migrants, especially asylum-seekers, particularly in relation to its overall population of about 10 million.

Over time this resulted in a large population with migrant background, but has also contributed to a strong socioeconomic development in spite of a seemingly ongoing global crisis. This indicates that migration has contributed in multiple ways to the development of the Swedish society: not only to a more balanced demographic development, ensuring avoidance of a negative, "inverted" population pyramid structure, but also adding to Sweden's creative capacities and technological development.

Although research shows that immigration has benefited Sweden, the challenges are not lacking. Two issues have been crucial. The large increase in newly-arrived in 2015 has resulted in a negative trend in politics, in the media and in public opinion. The question then becomes how to overcome such short-term negative trends. In addition, there is the longer term issue of establishing equal rights, duties and opportunities in regard to primary issues such as working life, housing, the legal system and education. These issues are of particular importance in helping migrants establish a belief in their future and their children's future in Sweden. Naturally these issues are important not only for migrants as well as ethnic and national minorities but also for others who risk discrimination and marginalisation in Sweden. It is also important in that such a belief can inspire individuals to fully contribute to Sweden's development and potentially their countries of origin.

Many researchers conclude that while immigration should be regarded as a resource, integration remains a challenge, especially as policymakers have drifted away from the principle of equal rights, duties and opportunities, which included a focus on problems within the majority society as well. Today there is a short term and shortsighted focus on new arrivals. While there are and certainly have been important short-term issues, there is the risk that those lead to short-sighted solutions that undermine the aspirations of migrants, thus needlessly limiting sustainable development in Sweden. Those aspirations are a key element to the proper use of the capabilities and creative capacities of all residents of Sweden, including migrants. At the same time in spite of difficulties concerning e.g. employment, it is also important to realise and recognize that most immigrants go to work every day and that many jobs and opportunities are created by immigrant businesses and initiatives. This will continue to be the case as long as Sweden continues to develop and implement forward-looking policies, such as the ones put forward in Caritas' recommendations.

9.2
Recommendations

The analysis in this report led to recommendations that focus on migration rights, human rights, equality, empowerment and respect. The recommendations for advocacy are directed toward Swedish society including migrants and migrant organisations, other civil society organisations (particularly those focusing on human rights, equality and/or migration), the Swedish Government, regional and local governments, as well as Caritas and its constituents.

1 Resolving gaps concerning migration law, policy and practice

Migration law and policy

- Caritas calls for total review of the Aliens Act (Utlänningslagen). Over many years, and in particular due to recent developments, a patchwork of legislation has been developed causing confusion and a lack of clarity for those implementing the laws. There is a disconnection between the implementers and the policy-makers. Concerning this type of broad review it is necessary that CSOs representing migrants and expertise in the field should be given a role in formulating the terms of reference as well as within the inquiry.

Practice – initial period in Sweden

- Concerning the initial period of migrants in Sweden, more practical guidance needs to be provided either through the responsible government agencies or through subsidies to migrant organisations and others who are already filling in the gaps for new arrivals. These gaps have to do with filling in forms, concerning family reunification, applying for schools, housing, health services etc.
- Invest in higher quality education concerning the Swedish language and society that is adapted to the needs of the individual.
- Develop validation methods and routines that are more efficient than the ones that apply today. This can mean developing means other than simply following a paper trail concerning education and practical experience.
- The Refugee Placement Act (Bosättningslagen) is an example of the patchwork above. To avoid a situation where some accept refugees and others do not, the act in theory requires all municipalities to accept the placement of some refugees in their municipality. However, the law lacks sanctions. The result is that some municipalities have taken in people to thereafter systematically place them in nearby municipalities. In order to achieve the purpose of the act, meaningful sanctions need to be added.[1]

2 Promotion of equality and prevention of discrimination

- The Discrimination Act needs to be reformed in terms of remedies and enforcement.
  - Economic damages should be available if a job applicant can show that they were the most qualified person for the job or alternatively that in addition to discrimination compensation the damages should be equivalent to one year's salary in relation to the job applied for.
  - In a discrimination case concerning working life, as part of the judgment, the court should be able to order the defendant to report back to the court within a year concerning the active measures taken during the year to prevent discrimination and promote equality in the workplace.

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1) Dagens Samhälle 2019-04-11, "Skånsk strid om nyanlända" (A conflict among Skåne municipalities on placement of new arrivals), author's translation, p. 1-4, https://www.dagenssamhalle.se/nyhet/skansk-strid-om-nyanlanda-27105.

- The law should be amended so that if an individual brings a case to court and he or she loses, the court will not be allowed to require them to pay the other party's court costs unless the court finds that the plaintiff lacked any reasonable reason for taking the case to court. This should also apply if a CSO files the case on behalf of the plaintiff.
- Concerning pay gap analyses, a system should be developed so that ethnicity is taken into account as well as gender.
- In addition to the DO and the unions, certain CSOs such as local anti-discrimination bureaus should be given the right to bring claims regarding the failure of an employer to undertake adequate active measures.

• The regulation on antidiscrimination conditions in public contracts needs to be reformed so that businesses know that they risk losing a public contract if they discriminate. This should heighten the awareness and interest of businesses concerning the Discrimination Act. In particular, this would provide an added incentive to employers with public contracts to actually implement the active measures requirements in the Discrimination Act, in practice as well as in form.

• Immigrants to Sweden who are citizens of EU countries, Iceland and Norway are given the right to vote in local elections basically as soon as they cross the border. Other immigrants, essentially non-Europeans must wait three years. Equal treatment should apply to all migrants, especially in regard to the right to vote in local elections.

3 Changing the negative narrative on migrants, refugees and migration

• Articulate and promote a vision in Swedish society of migrants as contributors to Sweden in all spheres, and as a bridge between different cultures and people.
• Recognise and promote migrants and their contributions as fellow human beings and as development actors, by acknowledging the importance of their economic contributions where they reside and their remittances as well as their 'social contributions' – including flows of skills, knowledge, ideas and values that migrants transmit from and to their origin countries – in the same way that Swedish migrants have done and continue to do.
• Advocate for proactive communication and policy by the national government as well as local governments, encouraging integration based on equal right duties and opportunities in all spheres of society such as employment, education, housing, health, and the legal system.
• Call for media responsibility in creating awareness of the rights and contributions of migrants, and in disseminating accurate and positive narrative, images and stories on migration, migrants and refugees.
• To the extent that a term is needed for the children of immigrants, promote the use of the term second generation Swedes instead of the term second generation immigrants, particularly in public documents etc.
• Establish partnerships with actors in the media and launch campaigns on social media to counter anti-migration and extreme right-wing campaigns in order to challenge them through positive and accurate discourse and narratives.
• Urge political, social, educational, business, sports, religious and community leaders, and public figures to speak up with strong messages of solidarity and respect, promoting equality of treatment and opportunities, and to condemn all racist, xenophobic, religious or other discriminatory behaviour or actions, including hate speech and violence.

4 Expand safe and legal pathways of migration, particularly in relation to the review of migration law and policy above

• Foster and simplify family reunification mechanisms as a form of legal migration.
• Create more legal pathways for rights-protecting regular migration to ensure that Sweden can attract and welcome the people it needs for economic and social well-being without encouraging irregular migration and exploitation of and discrimination against migrants.

5 Enhance the engagement and empowerment of migrants locally as well as concerning countries of origin

• Make increased funding available to further build the capacity of civil society, including migrant organisa-

tions. To the extent that the government provides funding to CSOs, the funding terms should emphasise the principle that an important reason for the support is so that CSOs can develop their capacity for advocacy and engagement in a critical dialogue with policymakers and others.

- Create an enabling environment for the participation of migrant organisations in the process of designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating public policies affecting human rights (including equality), migration and development.
- Include migrants themselves in any discussion about human rights, migration and development, for example, by encouraging participation in expert meetings, structured dialogues and workshops.
- Foster the participation of migrant organisations and other relevant organisations in identifying development priorities.
- Build on and promote the evidence highlighting the importance of involving diaspora and migrant organisations in policy dialogue and recognising them as actors of development both in the country of destination as well as in the country of origin.
- Ensure equality and non-discrimination trainings are part of established development organisations so that staffing policies better reflect the diversity of the society.

6 Enhance engagement of cities and local actors in integration focusing on equal rights, duties and opportunities

- Encourage the actions of local governments in promoting and facilitating migrants' inclusion through e.g. promoting equality and counteracting discrimination in their roles as employers, service providers, public contractors, local rule makers and democratic institutions.[2]
- In particular ensure that local governments address the needs of all residents including migrants by fostering migrant participation in governance in the communities where they reside.
- Assist municipalities with knowledge and advice about migrants and cooperate in local level activity concerning the welcoming and inclusion of migrants and refugees.
- Include diaspora organisation, churches, associations and labour unions in local integration policies to provide migrants with swift starts and contribute to mutual understanding between migrants and Swedish citizens.
- Promote faster introduction of migrant children from special classes into the normal education system. The results achieved from this type of model in one municipality has led to better results both for the migrant children as the non-migrant children.[3]

7 Apply and enforce labour law, decent work standards and occupational safety and health protection for all migrants (the ongoing exploitation and discrimination against certain groups of migrants living in Sweden is not acceptable).

- Strengthen labour law legislation in conformity with all relevant International Labour Standards/ILO Conventions and Recommendations and ensure full application to all persons working in Sweden.
- Ensure that the Work Environment Authority (AMV/Arbetsmiljöverket) in Sweden has an adequate mandate, resources and training to reach all workplaces where migrants (and nationals) are employed to ensure compliance with decent work and occupational safety and health standards.
- If businesses that are exploiting migrant labour or other labour have public contracts, ensure that anti-discrimination conditions are included in such contracts, requiring compliance with the law through the relevant contracting entity retaining the right to cancel the contract if the conditions are violated.
- Improve co-operation between the Swedish government, local governments, social partners and the International Labour Organisation to improve the realisation of the labour conditions and human rights all migrant-workers, such as minimum wages, decent work conditions and safe working environments.

2) In particular, see the work of UNESCO-LUCS and the local government network of Swedish cities against racism and discrimination.

3) Svenska Dagbladet, 2019-04-15, Lärarens idé gynnade både nyanlända och svenskfödda (The teacher's idea was positive for both new arrivals and the Swedish born) author's translation, https://www.svd.se/prisad-larare-tankte-om--nyanlanda-lar-sig-snabbare.

8 Strengthen Sweden's support for regional, national and integral human development elsewhere

- To address the causes of forced migration promote the implementation and inclusion of Goal 10 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): "Reduce inequality within and among countries" and compliance with the Paris Agreement regarding Climate Change. Also promote the further implementation of all other SDGs related to enhancing peoples' livelihood and security (SDGs 1, 2, 6, 11, 13), access to basic services and income (SDGs 3, 4, 8) and gender equality and peace (SDGs 5, 16). Also ensure that development aid UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
- Work together with diaspora and migrant organisations in international development assistance to build on their knowledge and understanding of the countries and the people and serve as bridges between both parties.
- Respect Sweden's international commitment concerning development aid without counting reception costs of asylum seekers as development aid.
- Ensure that budgets for migration and development are linked only if they both aim at the sustainable development agenda and humanitarian assistance.
- Ensure that development aid respects the principle of leaving no one behind; it cannot select beneficiaries based on the migratory status nor on their purported propensity to migrate.
- Support the positive effects of migration on countries of origin by strengthening knowledge, skills, and technology transfers as well as increased trade and commerce.
- Support the mobility of skills and social remittances, for example, by enabling circular migration, facilitating the temporary provision of experts with an immigrant background and encouraging the participation of diaspora/migrant groups in the development of their countries by establishing suitable cooperation frameworks.
- Encourage adoption of policies and measures to reduce costs of transactions for migrants' remittances sent to their country of origin. Take notice in particular of SDGs 10 target 10.c as a directive for advocacy: "the transaction costs of migrant remittances should be less than 3% – and remittance corridors with costs higher than 5% should be eliminated."

9 Improve data collection and knowledge to enhance the migration-development nexus

- Improve the collection, availability and use of reliable and disaggregated quantitative and qualitative data to improve understanding on the migration/development nexus as well as for ensuring rights protection, social protection and decent conditions for migrants to contribute to development in countries of origin and destination.
- Ensure that policy-makers in countries of origin and destination rely on the collection and analysis of gender and age-disaggregated migration data covering their situation, conditions, employment, education, social protection as well as economic, cultural, social and civic contributions when designing migration and asylum policies, taking into account the local reality and capacities.
- Carry out qualitative and quantitative scientific research on the aspects listed above as well as (voluntary) engagement of migrants in order to support good law, policy and practice on migration in a more targeted and sustainable way.

10 Ensure Human Rights protection of all migrants and refugees

- Promote ratification of the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990), ILO Convention 97 on migration for employment (1949) and Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and ensure prompt legislative enactment and implementation of their provisions whether or not ratified.
- Advocate that development and migration policies be human rights based and include systematic human rights impact assessment.
- Establish a National Human Rights Institution in Sweden.
- Irrespective of legal status or nationality, protect migrants from exploitation or precarious and unsafe living and working conditions.

- CHAPTER 10 -

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